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The Earned Income Tax Credit, Low-Income
Workers, and the Legal Aid Community
Jonathan P. Schneller
Adam S. Chilton"
Joshua L. Boehm***
Abstract
The Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC') is the largest US. welfare program,
with twenty-four million low-income Americans receiving $60 billion of disbursals in
2009. Through the EITC, working Americans with little or no tax liability can receive up
to nearly $6, 000 in refundable tax credits each year. Over the past two decades,
policymakers have increasinglyfavored the EITC over direct-transferwelfare programs,
citing its lower administrative expense (as recipients "self-certify" by filing taxes) and
incentives for recipients to work. Despite its political appeal, the EITC suffers deep
structuralflaws. Largely because EITC claimants have little guidance in navigating the
difficult filing process, they are subject to high rates of IRS audits and rescission of
benefits with penalties and interest. This proliferationof EITC-relatedcontroversies has
created an immense needfor legal assistance,yet low-income tax law largely remains a
peripheralconcern within the legal aid community.
In this article,we suggest a comprehensive and achievable set of reforms that the
IRS and legal services organizations can enact to improve the EITC's efficacy and
fairness. We first describe how the complexity of EITC eligibility criteria creates a
tremendous burdenfor low-income Americans, as they frequently lack advice in tax filing
and cannot afford legal representation in the event of a controversy with the IRS. We
then outline measures that the IRS should implement to make the EITC more accessible
and understandable to those qualifyingfor the credit, reducing the chance of an audit
and loss of benefits. In particular,we focus on improving the tax filing process, making
EITC audits more manageablefor recipients, instituting less adversarialproceduresfor
EITC-related Tax Court proceedings, and changing certain organizational structures
within the IRS. Finally, we propose several practicalways that the legal aid community
can enhance its supportof EITC recipients confronting an IRS audit or Tax Court action.
Most importantly, we argue that EITC assistance warrants greater Congressional
funding and higher strategic and budgetarypriority within legal aid organizations,given
that the EITC is now far largerthan the direct-transferwelfare programs on which legal
aid lawyers have traditionallyfocused.

Law clerk, Justice Elena Kagan, U.S. Supreme Court.
Ph.D. candidate. Harvard University Department of Government.
* J.D., Harvard Law School,
2012.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
In 1997, College of William and Mary government professor Christopher
Howard published The Hidden Welfare State. Howard's book described a phenomenon
of which many savvy observers were already aware: a prominent and growing proportion
of American social policy was being implemented through the tax code, using tax
expenditures, via mechanisms such as refundable tax credits.2 Programs such as the
Earned Income Tax Credit, the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit, and the Home Interest
Mortgage deduction all served social welfare objectives, but did so stealthily, through tax
provisions rather than cumbersome eligibility regimes associated with traditional welfare.
In this article, we explore one of the programs that Howard's study emphasized:
the Earned Income Tax Credit. The EITC has, since the mid-1990s, been a prominent
component of the American social welfare landscape. As we detail in Part II below,
annual EITC expenditures dwarf the funds disbursed through traditional welfare
programs such as the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF") program. And,
as a number of commentators have noted, the use of the tax system to administer the
EITC has led to a number of pathologies not associated with traditional welfare. Writing
in 1995, Professor Anne Alstott noted that "[t]he tax system's limitations render the EITC
inherently inaccurate, unresponsive, and vulnerable to fraud and error in ways that
traditional welfare programs are not." 3 More recent commentators have focused on ways
in which tax administration produces onerous and arguably unfair burdens for the lowincome workers seeking to claim the benefits to which they are entitled under the
4
program.
Our article chronicles the burdens that the EITC imposes upon low-income
claimants and examines the implications of these burdens. In particular, we focus on how
the legal aid community should respond to the EITC's status as the nation's preeminent
social welfare program. Two recognitions are crucial to our project. The first is that the
EITC's tax-based regime is uniquely burdensome for low-income taxpayers. The
program uses self-certification via the filing of a tax return, making taxpayers responsible
for determining and verifying their eligibility. Having provided no ex ante assistance in
determining eligibility, the program then employs a harsh, and arguably punitive, array of
auditing and adjudicative techniques that challenge taxpayer eligibility ex post.
Taxpayers unable to prove their eligibility to the IRS in a variety of correspondenceintensive and often adversarial processes are called upon to repay the benefit they
received, with interest and penalties. 5 This system is uniquely challenging to low-income
taxpayers who may lack the skills required to navigate the tax return and audit processes.
The second key recognition upon which we build is the EITC's centrality in the
American social welfare landscape. We argue that the legal aid community has allowed
the "hidden welfare state" to remain hidden, moving too slowly to develop a robust
1 CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE (1997).

2 Id. at 3 (noting that tax expenditures devoted to social welfare projects cost approximately $400
billion in 1995).
3 Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Creditand the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare
Reform, 108 HARv. L. REv. 533. 535 (1995).
4 See, e.g.. Leslie Book, The IRS's EITC Compliance Regime: Taxpayers Caught in the Net. 81 OR.
L. REV. 351 (2002); George K. Yin et al.. Improving the Delivery ofBenefits to the Working Poor: Proposals
to Reform the EarnedIncome Tax Credit Program. 11 AM. J.TAX POL. 225 (1994).
See Bryan T. Camp, The Failure ofAdversarial Processin the Administrative State, 84 IND. L.J.
57, 105 (2009).
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capacity to assist low-income taxpayers in navigating the vagaries of the EITC. While
the legal aid community has not wholly neglected the EITC-programs such as the Legal
Aid Society of Orange County's development of the I-CAN! software are laudable
6
initiatives 6it has not accorded the EITC the degree of attention one would expect for
the nation's largest welfare program. The result is a status quo in which low-income
workers must navigate the complexities of the nation's largest welfare program with a
bare minimum of legal assistance.
In the pages that follow, we argue both that the EITC's administration should be
reformed to make it better suited to the needs of its low-income clientele, and that the
legal aid community should respond to the centrality of the EITC in American welfare
policy by devoting greater resources and energy to assisting EITC claimants. We
proceed in four parts. Part II describes the rise of the EITC and details the various
aspects of tax administration that render the EITC difficult for low-income taxpayers.
Part III takes an internal approach to the problem, discussing and analyzing various
structural reforms to the program and IRS administration that would serve to soften the
program's harsh edges. Part IV takes an external approach, discussing steps that
Congress and the legal aid community can and should take in response to the EITC's
ever-growing prominence. Part V concludes.
II.
ADMINISTERING WELFARE THROUGH THE TAX SYSTEM:
BACKGROUND TO THE EITC
In this part, we discuss the difficulties that the EITC poses for low-income
individuals who seek the credit. In particular, we focus on how the program's tax-based
administration presents unique legal challenges for low-income individuals that are
different from those associated with traditional welfare. To do so, this part proceeds in
three sections. First, we provide background to the EITC, focusing on the program's
history and structure. We emphasize the unique choice to use applicant self-certification
via the submission of a tax return as the means for determining each claimant's eligibility
for the credit. Second, we discuss the costs and benefits of the EITC's reliance on selfcertification. We focus in particular on how self-certification imposes significant burdens
on claimants, who are required to certify their compliance with complex eligibility
guidelines and given minimal assistance in doing so. Third, we discuss the IRS's audit,
appeal, and Tax Court processes with a focus on how ill-fitted these processes are to the
skills and life experiences of unrepresented, low-income EITC recipients. The account
we provide in this section illustrates that the EITC's use of tax administration-both
through reliance on self-certification to make ex ante eligibility determinations and
through reliance on audits and Tax Court to make ex post judgments of taxpayer
compliance-imposes legal obstacles on low-income workers that merit the attention of
the legal aid community.
A.
History and Structure
The EITC was enacted in 1975 as a relatively modest wage-subsidy and payrolltax offset for low-income workers, implemented largely to provide a degree of economic
relief in the face of a significant recession. The credit was not initially viewed as a
major piece of social policy. It was implemented as a temporary measure and renewed
6 See

infra Part IV.A.
See Dennis J. Ventry. Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The PoliticalHistory of the
Earned Income Tax Credit, in MAKING WORK PAY: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AND ITS IMPACT ON
AMERICA'S FAMILIES 15, 25 (Bruce D. Meyer & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, eds. 2001).
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annually for several years in the mid-i 970s before policymakers began to recognize its
potential as a long-term fixture on the American social policy landscape. The credit had
a number of features that made it politically and ideologically attractive to policymakers
in an era when the orthodoxies of the welfare state were increasingly questioned by
commentators such as NYU professor of politics and public policy Lawrence Mead. 9
Most notable is the fact that, unlike the cash disbursements of traditional welfare, the
EITC could be framed as tax relief that provided work incentives to families. 10 That is,
the EITC was successful in large part because politicians viewed it as "a work-oriented
alternative to existing welfare programs.""
The welfare reform movement that began in the late 1970s fundamentally
transformed expectations of the EITC. As Dennis Ventry explains: "the EITC would
emerge from the welfare reform discussions at the end of the 1970s forever transformed.
It would no longer constitute simply a modest work subsidy; rather it would represent an
antipoverty device that could potentially raise the income of all working Americans
above the poverty line."12 The EITC gained increasing political salience, benefiting from
a major expansion in 1986.13 In 1996, when the Personal Responsibility and Work
Reconciliation Act replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") with
short-term state-administered welfare under the TANF program, the EITC took on an
increasingly prominent role, emerging as the largest anti-poverty program in the United
States. 14
Since 1994, federal spending on the EITC has been consistently higher than
spending on traditional federal welfare programs such as AFDC and its successor, TANF.
By fiscal year 2009, EITC benefits paid out to low income tax filers accounted for over
$60 billion in federal spending, compared to under $25 billion in federal spending on
TANF.15 To illustrate the long-term magnitude of this shift, EITC disbursals in 1980
were approximately $5 billion, whereas AFDC outlays were approximately $18 billion.
However, the winding path by which the EITC emerged as a major social welfare
program has possibly obscured the program's true significance from poverty lawyers.
These lawyers have historically viewed welfare litigation as a significant aspect of their
mission, but they have not widely adjusted their focus in recognition of the fact that a
significant proportion of this nation's welfare system is now administered through the tax
code. And this failure to acknowledge the importance of the tax code to low-income
workers is a mistake: as the following sub-sections illustrate, the EITC requires millions
8

Id. at 25-26.

9 See LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN AMERICA

(1993) (criticizing American welfare state as giving rise to undeserving class of nonworking poor)
LAWRENCE M. MEAD. BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1985) (arguing that

welfare benefits should be conditioned on willingness to work). See generally BRENDON O'CONNOR, A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE SYSTEM 93-238 (2004) (describing conservative attacks on

the liberal welfare state and the emergence of a "conservative" welfare system).
10See Ventry, supra note 7, at 26 (discussing 1979 Joint Committee on Taxation report on the
EITC).
1 Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Welfare by Any Other Name: Tax Transfersand the EJTC, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 1261. 1266 (2007).
12Ventry, supra note 7. at 26.
" See id. at 32-34.
14Id. at 34.
15Urban Inst. & Brookings Inst., Tax Facts, TAX POLICY CENTER,

http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfmDocid=266

(last visited July 12, 2011).
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of low-income Americans to engage the tax system each year, imposing significant
burdens on them in the form of a daunting application process and an often-punitive,
exceedingly complex auditing regime.
The challenges of applying for the EITC are a product of the fact that the credit is
processed through the federal income tax system.16 Because the EITC operates as a
refundable tax credit, in order to claim it, taxpayers file annual tax returns (even if they
have no tax liability) and, in the process, use the credit to reduce their liability below
zero. 17 The amount that is claimed below zero is then paid to the taxpayer in the form of
a tax refund.
In this system, potential beneficiaries are responsible for both initially
declaring their eligibility for the benefit and determining the size of the benefit to which
they are entitled. Taxpayers claiming refundable tax credits, like the EITC, typically
have their returns subjected to routine, mechanical scrutiny for mathematical error. The
EITC's reliance on applicant self-certification is arguably the program's defining
administrative feature, and is in stark contrast to the universalpre-certification regimes
employed by traditional welfare programs.19
The EITC's method for calculating the refund claimed by an individual filer can
be quite complex.20 In general, the potential size of the EITC that can be claimed by an
individual filer varies based on the taxpayer's income and the number of "qualifying
children" that a claimant has.21 Specifically, the credit is calculated by multiplying the
filer's earned income by a credit percentage tied to "qualifying children" who are claimed
as dependents by the filer.22 The credit then eventually flattens and phases out after
certain earning thresholds have been reached.23 These general requirements are subject
to exceptions and qualifications based on the nature of the income, the relationship with
the children claimed, and the claimant's marital and employment statuses. 24
Self-Certification: Costs and Benefits
B.
In this subpart we address both the advantages and disadvantages of employing
the tax code to administer the EITC. There are four benefits that EITC advocates often
claim as a result of this administrative form: first, high participation rates among eligible
16See Alstott. supra note 3, at 535 (noting that "because the EITC is a tax-based transfer program.

it faces significant institutional constraints that are not present in traditional welfare programs.") (emphasis
added).
17 See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Reforming Tax Incentives Into Uniform Refundable Tax Credits, in
POLICY BRIEF 3-4 (Brookings Inst., Ser. No. 156, Aug. 2006) (arguing that more than one-third of American
households do not have income tax liability in any given year).
8 See id. (arguing that the optimal delivery mechanism for all socially valued incentives embedded
in the tax code is the uniform refundable tax credit).
19See Ventry, supra note 11, at 1274-75; Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybridfrom Backfiring:
Delivery ofBenefits to the Working Poor Through the Tax System. 2006 Wisc. L. REV. 1103. 1129 (noting
that EITC recipients "are not made to go through the eligibility and verification gauntlet in the same manner
as other benefits' recipients."): Lawrence Zelenak. Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the EarnedIncome
Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1869 (2005) (The EITC's self-certification "is in sharp contrast with the
universal practice in welfare programs, such as Food Stamps and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF), in which the claimant must establish her eligibility to the satisfaction of a welfare bureaucracy
before receiving any benefits.").
20 See generally Book, supra note 4, at 361-63 (explaining that the tax credit is measured by
multiplying the taxpayer's earned income up to a specific amount by a credit percentage).
21See I.R.C. § 32(b) (2006) (prescribing method for calculation of EITC).
22 See Book, supra note 4,
at 362.
23 See I.R.C. § 32(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2006) (describing the phase-out
formula).
24 See Book, supra note 4,
at 362.
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individuals; second, reduced administrative costs; third, reduced stigma for program
participants; and fourth, the political advantage of enshrining entitlement programs in the
tax code, rather than in highly visible and politically controversial direct expenditures.
However, these advantages are not unqualified, and the EITC entails significant
disadvantages as well. As will be detailed below, these disadvantages involve significant
burdens for the low-income workers who are expected to navigate the EITC's byzantine
eligibility apparatus with a minimum of legal assistance.
First, the EITC boasts a higher participation rate than other social programs that
provide support for low-income families.25 One commentator has claimed that the EITC
can boast participation rates as high as eighty-nine percent.26 This is higher than
comparable estimates for the Food Stamps Program, for instance, in which participation
is currently estimated at seventy percent.27 Scholars generally attribute this increased
participation rate to the EITC's use of self-certification, which does away with timeconsuming and potentially humiliating visits to welfare offices.28 And, indeed, for many
EITC proponents, the EITC's high levels of participation are among the program's most
valuable features.29 However, it should be noted that there is a lack of empirical work
definitively connecting the EITC's pre-certification regime to its participation rate: it is
possible, for instance, that the EITC enjoys high levels of participation because it targets
low-income workers, who may be more likely to have the skills and initiative to apply for
benefits than do those who are both destitute and unemployed. 30
Second, another putative advantage of self-certification is the EITC's relatively
low administrative costs when compared to traditional welfare programs, which typically
require that potential recipients be pre-certified prior to the disbursement of benefits.3 1
Pre-certification requires the programs' administering agencies to employ a large number
of street-level intake workers in field offices around the country. Potential recipients
typically must meet with these intake officials multiple times prior to certification, and
then often have annual meetings for recertification.32 This stands in contrast with the
self-certification process by which eligible individuals claim the EITC on their tax
returns. The result is that the EITC is administered at a dramatically lower overall cost
than traditional welfare programs. Scholars have estimated that the IRS is able to
25 See,

e.g., Jeffrey B. Liebman, Who are the Ineligible EITC Recipients?, 4 NAT. TAX J. 1165,
1183 n.34 (2000).
26 Ventry, supra note 11, at
1265.
27 See id.
28See, e.g., David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs,
113 YALE L.J. 955, 1010 (2004) ("The EITC has a high participation rate but also a high overpayment rate.
These facts are likely due to the lack of a precertification process.").
29 See Zelenak, supra note 19, at 1915.
30 However, TANF also includes work conditions, suggesting that the EITC's work condition
alone
cannot explain its high participation rates. See Noah D. Zatz, What Welfare Requires from Work, 54 UCLA
L. REv. 373, 376 (2006) (describing TANF's work requirements).
31 See Alstott, supra note 3, at 534 (noting that advocates have argued that "because the EITC
is
part of the federal tax system, it is simpler and cheaper to administer than programs run by the welfare
bureaucracy .... ).
32 See Janet Holtzblatt, Choosing Between Refundable Tax Credits and Spending Programs,
93
PROC. ANN. CoNF. ON TAX'N 116, 119 (2000) ("Almost all food stamp applicants must visit a state office in
person during regular business hours to apply for benefits. Further, all claimants must complete a lengthy
application ... and provide extensive documentation to support the claim. Over 40% of food stamp
applicants make two or more trips to the state office to complete the initial application process.")

2012]

THE EITC, LOW-INCOME WORKERS, & THE LEGAL AID COMMUNITY

183

administer the EITC at a total cost that is 1-2% of benefits paid out.33 This is
substantially less than the rate for TANF, which is currently at ten percent of benefits
paid, or the Food Stamps Program, which is estimated to devote roughly 20-25% of its
budget to administration. 34
Third, the EITC's pre-certification regime may reduce the social stigma
associated with traditional direct spending welfare programs, which require beneficiaries
to engage in routine visits to welfare offices for face-to-face eligibility interviews. 35
However, there is a significant lack of empirical support for the proposition that the EITC
is less stigmatizing than traditional welfare. Scholars have noted that tax-based welfare
may also contain stigmatizing effects.36 And recent outrage in conservative media circles
about the fact that some taxpayers enjoy no (or negative) tax liability suggests that the tax
system may be still susceptible to the stigmas associated with traditional welfare. 37
Finally, another claimed advantage of the EITC is that tax expenditures travel a
different path through Congress than do direct outlays. Because the amount of federal
dollars spent annually on the EITC depends on the amount of benefits claimed by filers,
the program does not require large outlays in the appropriations process through
Congress. Moreover, welfare benefits administered through the tax system are less
visible and thus less politically controversial than are welfare benefits administered
through traditional bureaucracies.38
Unfortunately, there are also substantial costs to administering welfare through
the tax system. The most prominent such cost is a massive non-compliance epidemic, as
reliance on self-certification by applicants increases the potential for both deliberate fraud
and inadvertent error. The IRS estimates that for tax year 2004, between $9.6 billion and
$11.4 billion in erroneous EITC payments were made, approximately a quarter of the
$41.3 billion in EITC claims paid for that year. 39 A 2002 study of EITC payments in tax
year 1999 found similarly high rates of noncompliance, estimating that the IRS made
between $8.5 billion and $9.9 billion in erroneous payments (between twenty-seven
percent and thirty-two percent of that year's total EITC payments).40 The fact that as
much as a third of the program's benefits are diverted to ineligible recipients suggests
See, e.g., Zelenak. supra note 19, at 1884.
Id. at 1881-1882.
3 See Alstott. supra note 3, at 534 (noting that EITC advocates have argued that administering the
program through the tax system "affords greater dignity and privacy to beneficiaries."); see also Nat' I
Taxpayer Advocate, Running Social ProgramsThrough The Tax System, 2 2009 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 75, 78,
87 (2009).
36 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 28, at 1004 n. 152 ("[S]tigma effects may arise under the tax
system as well."): see also Timothy M. Smeeding et al.. The EITC: Expectation,Knowledge, Use, and
Economic and Social Mobility, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 1187, 1189 (2000) ("There are several possible
explanations ... including ... employees' unwillingness to inform the employer of EITC eligibility due to
stigma effects .... ).
3 See also, e.g, David Leonhardt, Yes, 47% of Households Owe No Taxes. Look Closer. N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2010, at BI (describing how lack of tax liability of low-income Americans has "become a
popular talking point on cable television and talk radio.").
3

34

38 See Jacob S. Hacker, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE 42-44 (2002) (arguing that "private social

benefits" administered through the tax code "are often characterized by both low visibility and low
traceability.").
39 Memorandum from Michael R. Phillips. Deputy Inspector Gen. for Audit, Dep't of the Treas., to
Nancy A. Nakamura. Comm'r. Wage and Inv. Div.. Internal Revenue Serv. 1 (Dec. 31, 2008).
40 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREAS., COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES FOR EARNED INCOME

TAX CREDIT CLAIMED ON 1999 RETURNS 3 (2002).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW

184

[Vol.3:177

that claims regarding the program's relatively low administrative costs should be met
with skepticism.
A related cost involves the imposition of a filing requirement on millions of
taxpayers who would otherwise not be obligated to file a tax return. It is estimated that
forty-seven percent of individual taxpayers do not have an obligation to file returns
because they have either a zero or negative tax liability for the year.4 ' Also, many of the
individuals who are forced to file tax returns to claim the benefits of the EITC lack the
sophistication of wealthier taxpayers, and as a result, completing the return imposes a
burden upon them. 42 This burden is especially acute given the EITC's complex
eligibility requirements, which may exceed the capabilities of many low-income workers.
In 1997, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") described the
credit's eligibility criteria as "nightmare of eligibility tests, requiring a maze of
worksheets." 43 The Institute noted that application for the credit requires a claimant to
consider:
nine eligibility requirements; the number of qualifying children-taking
into account relationship, residency and age tests, the taxpayer's earned
income-taxable and non-taxable; the taxpayer's adjusted gross income
("AGI"); the taxpayer's modified AGI; threshold amounts; phase out
rates; and varying credit rates. 44
AICPA's statement concluded that:
While Congress and the IRS may expect that the AICPA and its
members can comprehend the many pages of instructions and
worksheets, it is unreasonable to expect those individuals entitled to the
credit (who will almost certainly NOT be expert in tax matters) to deal
with this complexity. Even our members, who tend to calculate the credit
for taxpayers as part of their volunteer work, find this area to be
extremely challenging. In fact, we have found that the EITC process can
be a lot more demanding than completing the Schedule A - Itemized
Deductions, which many of our members complete on a regular basis for
their clients.
That taxpayer confusion over these eligibility criteria is a widespread
phenomenon, as illustrated by the fact that, in 1999, about $2.1 billion in erroneous EITC
claims were made by taxpayers who should have employed a filing status of "married
filing separately," which renders a taxpayer automatically ineligible for the credit. 45 The
fact that such a large number of EITC claimants select a filing status that renders them
automatically ineligible for the credit suggests widespread difficulty in navigating the
credit's complex eligibility criteria, and further indicates that the above-discussed noncompliance epidemic is attributable, at least in part, to taxpayer confusion rather than
deliberate fraud.

41 Roberton Williams, Who Pays No Income Tax?, 123 TAX NOTES 1583
(2009).
42

See Yin et al., supra note 4. at 263-64.

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Tax Simplification Recommendations. 97
TNI 95-21 (1997).
4

id
45 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 40, app. at C-2.
44
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Given these complexities, it is not surprising that many EITC claimants choose to
have their returns prepared professionally.46 In tax year 2003, seventy-one percent of all
EITC returns were prepared by a third party, and a higher proportion of EITC filers use
paid preparers than do middle- and upper-income taxpayers. 47 However, the fact that
EITC filers rely so heavily on external preparation appears to expose them to
incompetent or unscrupulous agents who, aware that the EITC can often result in a
sizeable payout, promise large refunds as an incentive to use their services, and often
issue predatory refund anticipation loans ("RALs") to EITC claimants.48 In low-income
communities, for instance, return preparation services have arisen to facilitate EITC
claimants' purchases at various retail outlets and car dealers. 49 Such services have
obvious incentives to deem any given taxpayer eligible for EITC, and, not surprisingly,
paid preparers are associated with a troublingly high rate of erroneous EITC claims: socalled "brokered non-compliance." 50 Moreover, these preparers are often fly-by-night in
nature and, as such, are often no longer in business when their mistakes are discovered by
IRS auditors.5 1 Taking a long-overdue step, the IRS published a rule in September 2010
that requires paid preparers to register and comply with a set of competency standards. 52
It will be critical for the IRS to follow through with vigorous and uniform enforcement of
this rule.
Currently, too few EITC claimants are taking advantage of the IRS's Volunteer
Income Tax Assistance ("VITA") program, which consists of trained community
volunteers who offer free tax help to low- and middle-income individuals-typically,
those making under $50,000 per year. 53 Even though the VITA staff members are not tax
professionals, several features of the program still make it a superior option to paid
preparation for most EITC claimants. First, VITA staff must undergo a rigorous training
program and pass qualifying examinations in order to prepare returns for various
individuals. For example, passing a basic exam allows a volunteer to prepare most
individual and family returns, but passing a more advanced exam is required to prepare
more complicated returns, such as those involving higher education credits or selfemployment. Second, there is a dual-layer review process in VITA preparations, in
which the initial preparer's work is always checked by a more experienced volunteer
before the return is filed. Finally, and most importantly, VITA is free, allowing the EITC
See Stephen D. Holt, Keeping it in Context: Earned Income Tax Credit Compliance and
Treatment of the Working Poor, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 183, 199-200 (2007). Separately, and beyond the
scope of this article, EITC claimants' need for tax preparation may well pose a normative concern insofar as
they are effectively paying a fee for their welfare entitlements.
47 See id. at 199.
48 See Janet Spragens & Nina Olson, Tax Clinics: The New Face ofLegal Services. 88 TAX NOTES
1525, 1526 (2000); see also Holt. supra note 46, at 200.
49 See Holt. supra note 46. at 201.
50 See Danshera Cords, PaidTax Preparers,Used Car Dealers, Refund Anticipation Loans and the
Earned Income Tax Credit: The Need to Regulate Tax Return Preparersand Provide Afore Free Alternatives,
59 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 351, 368 (2009) (defining "brokered noncompliance" as "noncompliance facilitated
by a paid preparer" and speculating that "[b]rokered noncompliance may be particularly serious among EITC
recipients. . . .").
" See Spragens & Olson. supranote 48, at 1526.
52Furnishing Identifying Number of Tax Return Preparer. 75 Fed. Reg. 60309 (Sept. 30. 2010)
(amending 26 C.F.R. Parts 1 and 602).
5 Free Tax Preparation
for You by Volunteers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=107626,00.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2012).
46
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claimants to keep more of their entitlement benefits. Paid preparation, by comparison,
can cost EITC claimants hundreds of dollars. 54
For the purposes of this article, though, perhaps the most important drawback of
the EITC's tax administration derives from the fact that when EITC claimants-who are
responsible for certifying their own eligibility-erroneously claim to be eligible, they are
required to engage the IRS's complex "deficiency process" encompassing
correspondence audits, the IRS Office of Appeals, and United States Tax Courts. 55
Taxpayers who are unsuccessful in vindicating their claims through this daunting process
are required to repay the benefit they have received, with interest, and often with
penalties as well.56 This susceptibility to legal penalties or loss of benefits, which will be
discussed in the following section, is especially concerning in light of inadequate legal
representation for EITC claimants. In sum, administering this anti-poverty regime
through the tax system, despite its lower cost to the government, can come at significant
personal expense to claimants, who are more susceptible to erroneous deprivation of their
entitlements when compared to participants in other welfare programs.57
C.
A Legal Labyrinth: Navigating the EITC Audit and Appeal Processes
Here we chronicle the unique dilemmas that confront low-income workers who
become enmeshed in the IRS's enforcement process. Such workers face a cumbersome
and often harsh bureaucracy, which they are forced to navigate, usually without
assistance. Failure to convince the IRS of the correctness of a tax return can result in the
taxpayer's being compelled to repay the EITC benefit, with interest and penalties. 58
Two points are crucial in considering the audit and appeals process described
below. First, as low-income workers, EITC claimants audited by the IRS are often not
equipped-in terms of education, resources, or expertise-to demonstrate their
compliance with the EITC's complex criteria. Second, the phenomenon described below,
in which an EITC claimant is compelled to engage the IRS's audit and appeals process, is
not a rarity. Indeed, the IRS has instituted a number of initiatives under which EITC
claimants are more likely to be audited than middle- and upper-income taxpayers.
Following a political firestorm over compliance in the mid-1990s, the proportion of IRS
audits targeting EITC claimants began a dramatic increase. 59 By 2004, an EITC
household was 1.76 times more likely to be audited than a household with an annual
salary over $100,000, and in 2005 a full forty-three percent of IRS audits of individual
taxpayers involved an EITC claim. 60
54 By way of example, the Cedar Rapids, Iowa VITA site reports that local commercial tax
preparers charge an average of $175 per return and an additional $125 per hour for preparation. Volunteer
Income Tax Assistance, CENTRAL CEDAR RAPIDS WEED AND SEED,

http://www.crweedandseed.com/Current%/ 20Programs/VITA/VITA.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2011).
5 See I.R.C. §§ 6211-6216 (2006).
56See generally Bryan T. Camp. The Failure ofAdversarialProcess in the Administrative State, 84

IND. L.J. 57, 105 (2009) (citing the National Taxpayer Advocate finding that accumulation of interest and
penalties often equal or exceed the original amount in dispute).
5 See Book, supra note 4, at 352 ("The EITC is excessively complicated in its application and can
have significant and sometimes unforeseen consequences on the lives of those who are the provision's
beneficiaries, largely the working poor. of whom great numbers are racial minorities and women.").
5 See supra note 56.
59 See Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin. Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers, in THE CRISIS IN
TAX ADMINISTRATION 148. 159 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod, eds., 2004).
60See id. ("[W]hile audit rates have generally fallen, the odds of being audited have increased for

low-income filers relative to other filers. In 1988 the audit rate among 1040A nonbusiness filers with
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In this section, we first discuss the high error rate associated with EITC claims.
We then examine the correspondence audits and Tax Court adjudication to which EITC
claimants are subjected when suspected of error. Finally, we examine the importance of
representation during the audit process, as well as the inadequacy of current programs,
such as the Low-Income Tax Clinic program that provides representation to low-income
taxpayers.
1.
High ErrorandAudit Rate
In the previous section's discussion of EITC noncompliance, we detailed the high
error rate of EITC claims and the erroneous payments that result. Politicians have
occasionally invoked these error rates as evidence that the EITC is broken and rife with
fraud.61 In 1995, for instance, Senator William Roth proposed legislation to reduce the
EITC, claiming that it was "probably the most abused program on the books." 62
Accordingly, Congress's efforts to deter and detect taxpayer abuse have focused
disproportionately on EITC recipients, notwithstanding the relatively low amount per
EITC controversy.63 Even though other methods for tax evasion-including corporate
tax shelters, failure to pay corporate income taxes, and the misuse of pass-through entities
to hide income-result in far more tax evasion than the EITC in absolute dollar terms, tax
compliance efforts have centered so predominantly on low-income earners that by 2003 a
taxpayer earning less than $25,000 was more likely to be audited than a taxpayer earning
more than $100,000.64 EITC claimants comprise over one-third of all individual IRS
audits and are audited at triple the rate (2.1% in fiscal year 2008) of non-EITC
taxpayers. 65
Congress has authorized substantial funding-approximately $150 million
annually-for auditing EITC compliance in recent years, and has enacted numerous
enforcement measures specifically for the EITC as well. 66 If an EITC claim is found to
be deliberately erroneous, the IRS can block subsequent EITC claims for ten years, and
even if negligence (rather than outright fraud) is the underlying reason, claims can
nonetheless be blocked for two years.67 Furthermore, Congress has tightened the number
of eligible children who can be claimed as qualifying dependents under the EITC, and
has imposed particularized due diligence standards on EITC preparers.68
2.

IRS Audit Process

The high prevalence of error in the EITC and the heightened enforcement efforts
that have resulted raise concerns as to the processes that the IRS uses to detect and
adjudicate cases of suspected error. Unfortunately, the IRS's elaborate audit process does
positive income below $25.000 was 1.03%, while the average audit rate among all filers was 1.5 7 %. By
2000 the audit rate was 0.49% for all taxpayers. but it was 0.6% among 1040A nonbusiness filers with
income under $25.000 and 1.4% among EITC claimants." (footnote omitted)); Holt, supra note 46. at 190-91.
61 See Book, supra note 19, at 1105-07.
62 Dana Milbank, Republican Senator and Two of His Constituents Illustrate Debate
on Tax Break
for Working Poor, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1995, at A12.
63 See Leslie Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does Not
Fit All, 51 KAN. L. REV.

1145, 115264(2003).
Id. at 1158.
6' Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate, Beyond EITC: The Needs ofLow Income Taxpayers
Are Not Being
Adequately Met, 1 2009ANN. REP. TO CONG. 110, 114 n.27 (2009).
66 See Book, supra note 4,
at 418.
6 See Holt, supra note 46,
at 194.
68 See Book, supra note 63, at
V146.
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not appear particularly well-suited to detect instances of noncompliance. In 2007, when
IRS auditors denied the EITC and claimants requested reconsideration, forty-three
percent of claimants ultimately received the EITC at an average amount of ninety-six
percent of what they claimed on their original returns.69 These statistics-which suggest
that the IRS's initial auditing process is only slightly more accurate than a coin toss-not
only reveal serious structural flaws in IRS auditing, but also, as we will argue in the next
section, underscore the need for effective representation for EITC claimants who face
potential denial of benefits. As the National Taxpayer Advocate has argued, "[g]iven the
significant barriers encountered by EIC taxpayers during the audit process, one must
consider whether many audited taxpayers are truly ineligible for EI[T]C, or whether they
were just unable to successfully navigate the IRS audit process." 70
After an EITC claimant is targeted for an IRS audit, the information-gathering
process is generally conducted on a "correspondence" basis through the mail, rather than
in a "field," face-to-face format. 71 While correspondence audits are likely less
intimidating to claimants than field audits, they pose significant disadvantages in terms of
the ultimate outcomes-especially with respect to accuracy and fairness-of EITC
determinations.72 For several important reasons, a mail-based audit system is ill suited
for low-income taxpayers.
First, EITC claimants are much more likely than other taxpayers to be transient
or homeless. 73 This creates multiple problems for correspondence audits. 74 Because they
change domiciles frequently (and often do not provide forwarding information to the post
office or the IRS), transient or homeless EITC claimants are simply less likely than other
taxpayers to receive the items that IRS auditors mail to them. 75 Many of the working
poor also spend intermittent periods of time in cars, motels, friends' or relatives' houses,
or temporary shelters, making it very difficult for the IRS to conduct an effective
correspondence audit of their tax returns.76 Considering that such audits can last for
months, a claimant's transience can easily disrupt an audit that is already underway,
particularly insofar as multiple addresses complicate the document-gathering process.
For instance, the process for proving a qualifying child's residency-which is the most
common EITC error-requires a number of forms, such as school and medical records,
which must have fully consistent data or a satisfactory and detailed explanation of any
inconsistencies for the IRS to grant approval.7 8
On a related point, the abstruse classifications used in the EITC compound the
difficulties that claimants face when responding to document requests. The National
Taxpayer Advocate has consistently found that the EITC eligibility rules, especially those
69 See

Nat'1 Taxpayer Advocate, The IRS CorrespondenceExamination ProcessDoes Not
Maximize Voluntary Compliance. 1 2009 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 158. 160 (2009).
70 Nat'1 Taxpayer Advocate, IRS EarnedIncome Credit Audits A Challenge
to Taxpayers. 2 2007
ANN. REP. TO CONG. 94, 108 (2007).
71See Holt, supra note 46, at 191 (noting that "[m]ost EITC reviews are correspondence

audits. . . .").
72 See
id.
73See Book, supra note 4, at 393.
74 See id. at 395.
75 Id.
76 See id. at 394-95.
77 Id at 395.
78 Id.
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for reporting family status for purposes of the EITC, are difficult for claimants to
interpret correctly.79 Again, the qualifying child issue illustrates this complexity: a
taxpayer's child can be qualifying under the dependency exemption but not for the EITC,
or vice versa. The lack of a uniform definition of qualifying child confuses claimants
unfamiliar with the tax system, who often understandably assume that there is no reason
why their children would somehow not be "qualifying" if they, as parents, could qualify
themselves. 80
Beyond the substantive complexity of EITC rules and required documents, EITC
claimants are often unsure which documents the IRS actually wants. One National
Taxpayer Advocate study found, for instance, that roughly half of taxpayers subject to a
correspondence audit contacted the IRS by phone or in person to clarify what forms they
needed to send in. Additionally, more than half of audited EITC claimants reported
difficulties in obtaining the requested documents, and nearly half of the same group did
not understand why the documents were requested in the first place.82 Furthermore, the
National Taxpayer Advocate's research shows that low-income taxpayers not only have
inadequate access to computers, but also below-average computer literacy, thus
complicating their ability to use the IRS's website (on which the agency relies heavily to
convey information to taxpayers) as an additional means for answering questions about
their obligations with respect to a correspondence audit. 83
EITC claimants are also far more likely than the average taxpayer to have
English literacy problems, whether as a result of educational disadvantages or from
speaking English as a second language.8 4 Although there are no studies explicitly
associating low literacy with poor EITC correspondence response rates, one could
reasonably draw from the results of a 1990 Census report-which demonstrated that an
individual's literacy skills were linked to the accuracy of Census returns-in surmising
that a similar effect likely applies to the EITC. 85 These taxpayers face obvious
difficulties in responding to an IRS correspondence audit. For instance, they often lack
the ability to understand what documents are required to satisfy certain gaps in their tax
filing. 86
Given that mail-based audits rely on a claimant's willingness to respond (and to
clarify points of misunderstanding before doing so), they are particularly ineffective in
cases where taxpayers are fearful of government interaction. This problem is prevalent
in cases involving recent immigrants, who are often concerned that by challenging the
government over a tax controversy, they will entangle themselves in an immigrationrelated matter as well. And even if these claimants were to contact the IRS in person or
via telephone to clarify an audit question, the IRS has no budget for translators, creating
another barrier to fair and effective audit resolution. 89
79 See, e.g., Nat'1 Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 65, at 114.
80 See Book, supra note 4, at 399.
81Nat'1 Taxpayer, Advocate, supra note 69, at 160.
82 Nat'1

Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 70, at 95.
Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 65, at 130.
84 Book, supra note 4,
at 394.
83 See Nat'1

8' See id. at 397.
86 Id.
87 See

88 Id.
89 Id.

Spragens & Olson. supranote 48, at 1526.

190

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW

[Vol.3:177

Finally, there is a marked disparity in the burdens that an IRS audit imposes on
low-income taxpayers when compared to their middle or upper-income counterparts.
While the latter can often delegate the task to a lawyer or accountant, and are bothered
only with respect to the costs associated with that assistance and any additional tax
liability (likely to be a small percentage of their financial resources), low-income
taxpayers must typically deal with the IRS on their own time and without professional
expertise. 90 These burdens can be considerable. In 2007, for instance, more than half of
EITC-audited taxpayers who reported submitting all of the IRS's ori inally requested
documentation also received a request for additional documentation. Likewise, more
than half of audited claimants reported that the IRS either took over a month to
acknowledge receipt of their documentation or provided no acknowledgment at all. In
her inaugural testimony to Congress in 2001 as the National Taxpayer Advocate, Nina
Olson remarked that if the IRS "subjected middle class and more affluent taxpayers to the
kind of intrusive inquiries we routinely subject a taxpayer to in an EIL[T]C audit, the entire
EI[T]C audit program would be shut down in response to taxpayer complaints." 92
No less problematic than the IRS's audit process is the use of U.S. Tax Court to
resolve cases in which an EITC claimant fails an audit. EITC claimants have their
disputes referred to Tax Court as a result of the culmination of the IRS's "deficiency
procedure." 93 If, after auditing, the IRS determines that tax filers' true tax liability
exceeds their self-reported tax liability, they are deemed to be "deficient." The IRS can
then choose to then send the taxpayer a "Notice of Deficiency." 94 After receiving the
notice, taxpayers who desire a formal hearing on their claim have ninety days to seek a
hearing before a U.S. Tax Court.9 5
The procedure that is followed in Tax Courts closely resembles the procedures
used in federal district court bench trials.96 Cases are tried before Special Trial Judges,
using rules of procedure similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and attorneys
from the Office of the IRS Counsel represent the government. If the amount in dispute is
less than $50,000 for a given tax year, as is typically the case with EITC claimants, tax
filers are able to invoke the small case procedures that are provided for in the Tax Court's
Rules of Practice and Procedure. 97 These proceedings, which are often referred to as "S"
cases, are specifically designed to accommodate pro se representation. To facilitate that
goal, there are several changes to normal procedure. Those include not requiring the
taxpayer to file a reply brief and trials "conducted as informally as possible consistent
with orderly procedure." 9 8 Despite the procedures that are afforded to EITC claimants in
"S" cases, the process is still inherently adversarial. In these adversarial proceedings,
90See Book, supra note 4, at 392-93.

9 Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate. supra note 70. at 95.
92 See Book, supra note 4,
at 424.
93See I.R.C. §§ 6211-6216 (2006).
94 See I.R.C. § 6213 (West 2011).
95 id
96

See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 1.06[1] (Rev. 2d ed. 2002)

(discussing the mechanics of designating a case to be treated as a small tax case).
97

See DAVID M. RICHARDSON. JEROME BORISON & STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE 222 (2d.

ed. 2008).
9' U.S. TAX CT. R. 174(b); see also U.S. TAX CT. R. 173(c) (noting that a reply is necessary only if
the Court orders a reply), 174(c) (noting that neither briefs nor oral arguments are required unless by Court
order).
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there is strong burden of proof placed on the defendant and they are expected to zealously
represent themselves. 99
While the "S Case" procedure is likely to ameliorate certain difficulties that lowincome litigants face in a formal adversarial setting, there is still a fundamental
incongruity between the Tax Court's use of adversarial process and the EITC's
predominantly low-income, pro se clientele. As Barbara Bezdek noted in commenting on
similarly informal adversarial processes used in Baltimore rent courts, "the rule-oriented
court talk expected and privileged by judges in low-level courts bears little or no relation
to people's natural narratives. The rules of courtroom discourse are seldom explained to
those witnesses expected to conform to them." 0 0 Lucie White similarly notes that civil
litigation "evoke[s] feelings of terror for many poor people,"' 0 who:
perceive litigation as an alien or even hostile cultural setting. The talk
and ritual of litigation constitute a discourse and a culture that are foreign
to most poor people. Poor people obviously do not speak in the same
dialect that lawyers, judges, and elite businesspeople use. Furthermore,
their courtroom speech is routinely interrupted by lawyers and judges
who use threatening tones in ordering them when not to talk and what
not to say. Their stories are interpreted by black-robed authorities on the
basis of rules that are rarely explained and norms that they seldom
share.1 02
This dynamic is evident in reported Tax Court cases adjudicating EITC
compliance, as when a Tax Court judge criticized a taxpayer who appeared to have
difficulty speaking English with "vague and inconsistent assertions," 103 or when a judge
summarily dismissed the testimony of an EITC claimant's low-income witnesses as
conclusory, vague, and biased by the taxpayer's interests.104 In short, just as it is
troubling to expect low-income taxpayers to navigate the complexities of the Internal
Revenue Code without assistance, it is likewise troubling to subject them to
correspondence-based audits and adversarial adjudication when they are suspected of
noncompliance.
3.

Importance of Representation

In general, legal services organizations have not assisted EITC claimants in
navigating the legal complexities of an IRS audit-or, for that matter, in handling any
subsequent proceeding or adjudication. os This is partly because the importance of tax
law pertaining to low-income taxpayers is a relatively recent development, driven
predominantly by the rapid growth of the EITC over the past few decades. Before the
EITC, poor people had little to no interaction with the tax system, so there was no reason
for legal services and pro bono lawyers to offer tax-related advocacy. But now, as the
EITC has developed into the country's largest vehicle for delivering welfare benefits, it
99 See Camp, supra note 5, at 89.
100See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participationand Subordinationof Poor Tenants'
Voices in Legal Process,20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 533, 588 (1992).
'0 Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak.

16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535. 543 (1987).
102Id. at 542-43 (footnotes omitted).
'03 See Diaz v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1420 (2004).
104
See Baker v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 949 (2006).
105See Spragens & Olson, supra note 48, at 1525.
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has radically reshaped the legal challenges confronting poor Americans and created a
need for tax representation for low-income taxpayers.
This need has been hard to meet for several reasons. First, tax law is widely
perceived as a complex, isolated discipline that demands considerable specialization. 10 6
Given the resource constraints on many legal services organizations, it may be difficult to
hire personnel with such expertise (or even to justify doing so, given that the salary could
go toward a generalist who could handle a broader range of client matters).107 Also, the
tax bar-which practices in a realm traditionally viewed as "rich people's law"-has
generally not emphasized low-income issues or focused on pro bono services in a
systematic way.
Largely because the EITC's complexity makes it so difficult for claimants to
manage the audit process themselves, the availability and quality of representation are
often crucial factors in determining the outcome of an audit. In 2004, low-income
taxpayers with representation were twice as likely as their non-represented counterparts
to emerge from an IRS audit with no change in their claimed EITC, at rates of 41.5% and
23.1%, respectively. 109 Those with representation, moreover, retained 44.8% of the

EITC on average, as opposed to only 25.3% for unrepresented taxpayers.110 The type of
representation also matters. For instance in 2004, claimants represented by an attorney or
CPA retained their EITC amount in full 45.8% of the time, while being disallowed their
entire amount at a rate of 48.5%. 11 This stands in contrast to claimants represented by
actuaries, law and accounting students, family members, and employees of the claimant's
organization, who retained their full EITC entitlement in just 35.4% of cases and lost the
entire benefit 5 9 .1% of the time. 112
While these statistics show, perhaps unsurprisingly, that advocates with more
relevant and advanced training have more success in representing EITC claimants, the
more important question at present is whether EITC claimants are at least receiving some
sort of representation. This is because the vast majority of claimants (98.2%) still do not
have any representation during an IRS audit, and, as noted above, the outcome
differential is much greater between represented and non-represented taxpayers than it is
among types of represented taxpayers.11 3 Additionally, the largely all-or-nothing nature
of an EITC audit heightens the stakes of having representation: only around five percent

106See Book, supra note 4, at 412 ("lawyers tend to view tax law as an isolated discipline, requiring
great specialization due to the area's complexity, both substantively and procedurally."). See generallyPaul

L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers. 13 VA. TAX. REV. 517

(1994) (discussing the popular misconceptions of tax law and tax attorneys).
107See, e.g.. Algodones Associates, The American BarAssociation Legal Needs Study.

http://www.algodonesassociates.com/legal services/assessingneeds/abalegal.htm (last modified Oct. 9.
1998) (documenting the many legal needs facing America's poor without mentioning tax issues either as a
concern or a priority).
108See Book, supra note 4, at 412 (noting that the tax bar has not been broadly involved in
providing pro bono services); see also Spragens & Olson, supra note 48, at 1529.
'09 Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate, EITC Examinations and the Impact of Taxpayer Representation, 1
2007 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 222, 226 (2007).
110Id.

" Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 70. at 94, 110.
112 Id.
11

3Id.

at 94 n.1, 97.
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of cases result in a reduction of EITC benefits, as opposed to a total preservation or
denial. 14
Congress has taken some steps to fill the representation gap for EITC claimants.
The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act ("RRA") of 1998, in relevant part, established a
$6 million program within the IRS that provided matching grants up to $100,000 to law
and business school clinics and other 501(c)(3) organizations that provide free tax law
assistance to low-income taxpayers.11 5 These groups, known as low-income taxpayer
clinics ("LITCs"), can represent taxpayers in disputes with the IRS, provide outreach and
education to taxpayers who speak English as a second language ("ESL"), or both.116 The
IRS's National Taxpayer Advocate office has administered the LITC program since
2003.117 Of the 162 LITCs operating in 2009, twenty clinics dealt with ESL issues only,
while forty-five clinics focused on IRS controversies alone and ninety-seven clinics
offered both services.
In 2008, LITC-based advocates worked for 30,648 taxpayers on
a total of 37,391 issues, opening 10,142 cases (of which 1,804 were submitted to the U.S.
Tax Court). 119 LITCs are the principal option for low-income taxpayers seeking
representation during an IRS audit; in light of the above discussion of how important
representation is in ensuring that audit outcomes are fair and accurate, LITCs clearly play
an essential role in the EITC framework.
However, there are serious limitations on the efficacy of LITCs as currently
structured and administered. Similar to legal services organizations more broadly, LITCs
likewise suffer from a lack of financial resources in meeting demand for their
assistance. 120 Compared with the amount of funding dedicated to compliance and
enforcement of the EITC (roughly $150 million annually), the roughly $10 million
annual outlay for LITCs is relatively small.121 Moreover, IRS employees who deal with
EITC claimants cannot simply refer them to the nearest LITC for assistance, in light of
government ethics rules prohibiting employees from recommending specific attorneys or
accountants or from endorsing any "product, service, or enterprise."1 22 The IRS deputy
ethics official has interpreted these rules to mean that IRS employees can provide
taxpayers with contact information for particular LITCs only if the taxpayer specifically
asks, citing LITCs' similarity to law firms insofar as they have a fiduciar' responsibility
to the taxpayer, provide legal advice, and represent taxpayers in court.
The National
Taxpayer Advocate, Nina Olson, has disagreed with this assessment, arguing that LITCs'
congressional authorization, public-service orientation, and target population of low-

Id. at 108.
Spragens & Olson, supra note 48, at 1525.
116 Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate, supra note
65, at 117.
117 Nancy S. Abramowitz, Thinking About Conflicting GravitationalPulls:
LITCs: The Academy
and the IRS, 56 AM. U.L. REV. 1127, 1129 (2007).
118 Nat'1 Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 65, at 117.
114
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120 See,
121 Low

e.g., Book, supra note 4, at 418.
Income Taxpayer Clinic GrantRecipients Announced, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.
(Apr. 21,
2009). http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0.,id=206743.00.html.
122Hearing on the 2008 Tax Return FilingSeason, IRS Operations,FY 2009 Budget Proposals,
and The National Taxpayer Advocate's 2007 Annual Report to CongressBefore the Subcomm. On Oversight
of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means. 110th Cong. 29 (2008) (written statement of Nina E. Olson, Nat'l
Taxpayer Advocate).
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income taxpayers distinguishes them sufficiently from law firms to warrant an exemption
from referral restrictions.124
III.
IRS REFORMS TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF AMERICA'S WORKING
POOR
In Part II of this article, we explored the development of the EITC into America's
largest anti-poverty program and the shortcomings in the system that make it difficult for
the working poor to both claim and protect the benefits that they are entitled to under the
program. Essentially, the working poor are asked to certify their own eligibility for a
welfare benefit without any assistance. If suspected of non-compliance, the working poor
often must enter, without counsel, into a demanding adjudicative process with harsh,
borderline-punitive consequences for recipients who fail to convince the IRS of their
eligibility. Two potential avenues toward reform may alleviate these problems. The first
has to do with the administration of the program itself. It is conceivable that the IRS
could undertake administrative reforms aimed at rendering the process of ex ante EITC
application and ex post EITC adjudication more humane. The second is ameliorative in
nature and involves the legal services community. Assuming that the IRS does not
undertake to comprehensively reform the mechanisms for certification, delivery, and
audit of the EITC, Congress and the legal services community can recognize the
centrality of the EITC for millions of low-income working families, and take steps to
make legal aid for low-income taxpayers a greater priority. This part of the article
addresses the former of these two options-IRS reforms aimed at rendering the EITC
process more humane. In turn, in Part IV we will address the latter option and advocate
specific steps that Congress and the legal services community can take in response to the
recognition that the EITC is among the central pillars of American welfare policy.
Since a decision has been made to use the tax system to implement one of the
nation's largest welfare programs, considerations of both efficient administration and fair
treatment would seem to counsel that significant changes be made to the current structure
of the IRS to make the benefit easier for potential EITC claimants to both initially claim
and subsequently protect during audits and Tax Court proceedings. The case for such
reforms is intuitive: even if one does not linger on the harsh consequences described in
Part II of this article, there is simply no reason to believe that an IRS administrative
apparatus that evolved to collect taxes from middle- and upper-income taxpayers would
serve as a fair or efficient medium for administering a welfare program for low-income
workers.
Accordingly, we will examine five areas where the IRS should implement
changes to its structure, policies, and procedures to help ease the legal burdens that IRS
processes and procedures place on EITC claimants. First, we will discuss the need to
reexamine and reconsider the structure of the IRS. Second, we will explore the
possibility of splitting the EITC into two distinct benefits. Third, we will analyze the
possibility of reforming the EITC tax filing process, and the potential benefits of a
"Ready File" system. Fourth, we will offer reforms to modify the auditing of EITC
claimants. Fifth, we will present a proposal to employ less adversarial procedures for the
Tax Court proceedings applied to EITC claimants that are deemed "deficient" following
an audit. These reforms, if adopted either individually or in concert, would represent a
substantial step toward helping to ease the burden that the EITC places on America's
working poor.
124 Id.

at 33.
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A.
Evaluating and Reforming the Structure of the IRS
The decision to administer the EITC through the tax system has large
implications for the overall mission of the Internal Revenue Service. In 2010, the
Congressional Budget Office estimated that, between 2009 and 2013, the EITC will result
in roughly $250 billion in foregone revenue.125 This means that administering social
welfare programs will come to be a more significant part of the IRS mission, and changes
should be made to the structure and nature of the IRS to reflect that reality.
Despite the fact that the IRS is now the agency charged with delivering
America's largest welfare program, the IRS's core mission remains to collect revenue.
Currently, the IRS collects ninety-six percent of all federal tax receipts.126 Moreover, the
IRS's primary institutional goal is addressing the "tax gap," which is the difference
between the amount of taxes due and the amount of taxes actually collected.127 This
emphasis frustrates the goals of using the tax system for social policy in two ways. First,
the most reliable current estimate of the magnitude of the annual gross underreporting
gap comes from 2001, when it was calculated at $345 billion.128 Of this total, $285
billion was from incorrect reporting on tax returns (as opposed to failure to file or
pay).129 The individual income underreporting gap was approximately $197 billion of
the $285 billion total. 130 In contrast, the amount of incorrectly claimed credits, including
the EITC, was only $17 billion. 13 1 This means that incorrectly claimed credits account
for less than five percent of the total tax credits, which is a relatively minor fraction of the
total.132 Second, the emphasis on closing the tax gap also motivates the IRS to attempt to
crack down on non-compliance instead of promoting participation in programs. These
two goals are often in conflict with each other, and the mission and culture of the IRS
often leads to the collection and compliance activities of the IRS overshadowing the
social policy objectives of programs such as the EITC.
As a result, the IRS should reevaluate its mission statement to acknowledge its
dual roles of promoting tax compliance and delivering social programs. New Zealand is
an illustrative example of how this can occur, as highlighted by the U.S. National
Taxpayer Advocate.
In 2004, New Zealand passed a comprehensive social welfare
program aimed at combining support to families with incentives to work that is
administered through the country's tax system, Inland Revenue. 134 This reform "had
three key objectives: making work pay, ensuring income adequacy, and supporting
125CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. No. 4220, TRENDS IN FEDERAL TAX REVENUES
AND

12 (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/119xx/docl1976/2010-1202_IncomeTax chartbook.pdf.
26
1 See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.. DEP'T OF THE TREAS.. UPDATE ON REDUCING
RATES

THE FEDERAL

TAX GAP AND IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 2 (2009); Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 35, at 92.

127
See Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 35, at 92.
128INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.. supra note 126, at 4.
129 Id.

130Idr
131Id.

132
See Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 35, at 82-83 (noting that "approximately 55
percent ... of the individual underreporting gap ... came from understated net business income, such as
unreported receipts and overstated expenses for self-employed taxpayers ... [compared to] only about nine
percent . . . from overstated tax credits.").
' Id. at 87.

134
See Taxation (Working for Families) Act 2004 (N.Z.), available at
http://www.1egislation.govt.nz/act/public/2004/0052/1atest/whole.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2011).
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people ... into paid work." 135 Since this changed the mission of Inland Revenue to
create a greater emphasis on delivering benefits, instead of promoting compliance, a
comprehensive "analytical redesign process" was undertaken.136 This process helped to
change the culture, structure, and emphasis of the agency to recognize the new dual
mission. Although the reforms have only been in place a few years, initial econometric
research has suggested that New Zealand's reforms have resulted in increases in
employment and hours worked due to the tax reforms. 137
In America, despite the fact that the EITC has existed since the mid-1970s and
been a major part of our welfare system since mid-1990s, the IRS has yet to undergo a
reform process that recognizes the importance of the social programs that Congress has
chosen to deliver through the tax system.138 Given the importance of the EITC to
American welfare policy, this is a necessary step that should be considered to transform
the IRS from an organization predominantly concerned with enforcement to an agency
with the separate roles of revenue collection and social policy administration. Although
these reforms may dramatically transform the IRS, the Federal Reserve can provide an
example of an institution that has successfully adopted two theoretically conflicting
missions. 139 Under the Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977, it is the dual mission of the
Federal Reserve to promote production and employment while curbing inflation. 140
Although the Federal Reserve's dual role has come under attack recently by members of
Congress who feel that the focus should be solely on keeping inflation low, 141 these
criticisms appear to highlight the fact that the Federal Reserve has internalized the
importance of both parts of its mission.142
135Joanne

Hames, FacilitatingFertility and PaidWork: Contemporary Family-FriendlyPolicy
Initiatives and Their Social Impacts in Australasia, 34 Soc. POLY J.N.Z. 25, 29 (2009).
136See Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 35,
at 87.
137John Fitzgerald, Tim Maloney. & Gail Pacheco. The Impact ofRecent Changes
in Family
Assistance on Partneringand Women's Employment in New Zealand,42 N.Z. ECON. PAPERS 17, 48 (2008)
(stating that their study "provide[s] some evidence of employment increases and more solid evidence of work
hours increases for those working due to the Family Assistance policy change.").
138See Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 35, at 87. The National Taxpayer Advocate has also
proposed changing the reporting structure of the IRS to adopt a more "programmatic approach." Id. at 95.
Although reforms of this nature might ultimately be necessary for the IRS to be able to successfully close the
tax gap while still promoting legal participation in social programs that are administered through the tax
system, evaluating the strength of these claims would ultimately require a more thorough study of the
existing IRS organizational structure.
139See 12 U.S.C. § 225(a) (2006) (establishing that the monetary policy objectives of the Federal
Reserve are to "maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the
economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates."): Aaron Steelman. The FederalReserve 's
'DualMandate': The Evolution of an Idea, FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND EcoN. BRIEF 1 (Dec. 2011).
available athttp://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic brief/2011/pdf/eb_11-12.pdf
(stating that the mandate to promote maximum employment while keeping inflation low can be conflicting).
140See id
141See Sewell Chan, Republican Proposal Takes Aim at Fed's
Dual Role, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.16,
2010, at B3 (quoting Representative Mike Pence of Indiana, stating that: "[i]t is time to return the Federal
Reserve to the singular mission of protecting the fundamental strength and integrity of the American dollar.")
142As Aaron Steelman of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond has recently pointed out, the idea
that the Federal Reserve is responsible "for both securing the value of the nation's currency as well as
promoting employment" has been "prominent during most of its existence." Steelman. supra note 139. at 5.
Steelman also highlights how the Federal Reserve has largely remained faithful to balancing its two mandates
even where public sentiment strongly favors one goal over the other (e.g., in times of high inflation or high
unemployment). See id
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If the IRS were to recognize the importance of delivering social programsspecifically the EITC-to its mission, it could undertake a variety of experiments to
address the myriad incongruities that, as Part II makes clear, currently bedevil the
program's administration. 4 3 The ultimate success or failure of the specific reforms
discussed in sub-parts B-E may ultimately be reliant on thoroughgoing structural reforms
that vest responsibility for EITC in an administrative structure focused on social policy.
B.
Changing the Eligibility Structure of the Earned Income Tax Credit
In addition to reevaluating the mission of the IRS, the structure of the EITC
should also be altered to allow for greater participation in the program. Currently,
eligibility for the EITC reflects two basic considerations: income and family structure.14 4
The result is that individuals hoping to apply for a refundable tax credit due to their low
income must also provide information on how many months of the year they have
custody over children, or other complicated information about their overall eligibility.
This causes several distinct problems.145 First, this requirement makes the application
more burdensome and deters many applicants who are intimidated by the process.
Second, the verification process is more difficult because confirming eligibility for the
EITC requires examining income and family structure, which are two separate inquiries.
Third, requiring applicants to provide information on both issues increases the likelihood
that they will make a mistake, and thus increases the frequency of audits and denied
claims.
To address these problems, the EITC could be broken into two separate tax
credits: a "Worker Credit" and a "Family Credit." This approach has been advocated by
the National Taxpayer Advocate in its 2005 and 2008 annual reports to Congress,146 and
was reiterated by the National Taxpayer Advocate in testimony to the Senate in 2011.147
This approach was also endorsed by the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax
Reform in 2005.148 The United Kingdom has split its equivalent of the EITC into two
separate, smaller tax credits that mirror this proposal: the "Working Tax Credit" and the
"Child Tax Credit." 14 9
The National Taxpayer Advocate has argued that such a divided credit would
entail a number of advantages. First, breaking the EITC into two separate credits would
simplify the process by which the working poor apply for tax benefits. As previously
noted, potential claimants are required to provide information on both their income and
family status. If the process is reformed so that potential applicants are able to claim a
"Worker Credit" without also being forced to apply for the "Family Credit," many
143See

Book. supra note 4. at 382.
Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate. supra note 35, at 90.
145See generally id. at 90-91 (describing family status eligibility as a difficult fact and
circumstances based assessment).
146Nat' Taxpayer Advocate, Tax Reform For Families: A Common Sense Approach, 1 2005 ANN.
REP. TO CONG. 397, 397-406 (2005); Nat'1 Taxpayer Advocate, Simplify the Family Status Provision, 1 2008
144See

ANN. REP. TO CONG. 363, 363-69 (2008).
147 Hearingon Complexity and the Tax Gap: Making Tax Compliance Easierand Collecting
What's Due Before the Committee on Finance of the United States Senate, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (written
statement of Nina E. Olson. Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate).
48

1

PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM. SIMPLE. FAIR AND PRO-GROWTH:

PROPOSALS TO Fix AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM (2005).
149See Tax Credits, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.uldtaxcredits/index.htm (last
visited Aug. 30, 2011).
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additional eligible workers may apply each year. This is because potential claimants
often have confusing family structures and relationships, and are unsure how to document
them on their tax return. On the other hand, workers often know much more precisely
whether their earned income would meet the requirements of a "Worker Credit." As a
result, the reformed self-certification process would not scare off potential applicants by
reframing their eligibility for the overall credit into two separate inquiries. Additionally,
dividing the credit into two payments would have the benefit of lowering incentives to
cheat or provide misinformation on the application, because applicants will be more
aware of the fact that they can still be eligible for part of the benefit without meeting
other eligibility requirements.
Second, a divided benefit would help improve the verification process for
claimants' eligibility. Assessing income eligibility for the program is undertaken in part
through electronic verification of income data submitted on applicants' W-2 forms. This
electronic checking is identical to the verification that is done for individuals claiming a
standard deduction who do not also claim the EITC. The more difficult eligibility
verification, however, is determining family status. For example, to claim a qualifying
child, a claimant must meet four tests: (1) a relationship test, (2) a residency test, (3) an
age test, and (4) a support test. 1o Verifying any of these tests requires the IRS to collect
additional data. The IRS, as a result, has great difficulty assessing these elements of
eligibility for the credit (such as whether a child lived with the claimant or with another
parent). Separating the EITC into two separate credits would disentangle the simple task
of verifying eligibility based on income from the complex task of verifying eligibility
based on family structure.
Finally, creating two separate credits in place of the EITC would also streamline
the auditing process. During the auditing process, individuals are asked to provide
information on various aspects of their eligibility for the credit. 15 If, however, the IRS
only has questions on one of the credits being claimed, the audit would be less
intimidating and require less information. This has the advantage of both decreasing the
total number of audits that need to be performed, and also increasing the number of
eligible applicants that are able to keep their refund despite being audited. This is critical
given the EITC audit process's daunting requirements and alarmingly high error rate,
which causes a significant number of taxpayers to lose their benefits during the auditin
process simply because they have difficulty complying with the audit's requirements.
If there were fewer audits needed to administer two separate tax credits, and the audits
that were to occur required less information, it is likely that fewer qualifying low-income
families would lose the benefit of this program.
C.
Changing the Application for the Earned Income Tax Credit
One of the primary reasons that the EITC has higher participation rates than other
social welfare benefits is that most adult Americans file tax returns.153 Given this reality,
the burden of claiming the EITC is minimal compared with the burden of filing a separate
application that is required for most other welfare benefits. 154 Additionally, the
0 See I.R.C.

§ 32

(2006).

...
See Book. supra note 4. at 381.
152Nat'1 Taxpayer Advocate, EarnedIncome Tax Credit Audit ReconsiderationStudy. 2 2004 ANN.
REP. TO CONG. (2004).
153Id. at
154 Id.

88.
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perceived burden is lower due to the EITC's self-certification process, under which
potential claimants only have to interact with the government directly if they are subject
to an audit. That said, despite the fact that most adults do file tax returns, it is estimated
that in 2009 forty-seven percent of all individual taxpayers do not have an obligation to
file tax returns because they have either a zero or negative tax liability. 155 As a result, by
choosing to administer this welfare benefit for low-income workers through the tax
system, the government is imposing the potentially significant burden on many EITC
claimants of filing a tax return that they would otherwise not be required to file. Given
that this is often a burden for EITC tax filers, the IRS should take steps to simplify the tax
return that individuals with no tax obligation are required to complete.
As part of that goal, the IRS should take steps to develop a "Ready Return"
modeled on the program that was developed in California in 2005.
A "Ready Return"
program recognizes the reality that there is usually little need for a taxpayer to fill out
information on her income or to complete complicated math. Income data from W-2
forms are submitted to the IRS by employers who withhold their employees' taxes.
Currently, when a tax filer completes a tax return, the IRS checks the information
provided by the filer against the information provided by the employer.15 7 This system,
however, can be beneficially inverted. Instead of asking tax filers to submit the
information for the IRS to double check, "Ready Return" programs present tax filers with
pre-populated forms that contain their individual income information that are submitted
by their employers. Tax filers then simply confirm that the information submitted by
their employers is accurate and comprehensive.158
In California, the "Ready Return" is only available to individuals filing very
simple tax returns who do not claim many deductions or sources of interest income. 159
Although this may prevent the "Ready Return" from serving as an overall fix for the tax
return system, it should not prevent the development of a similar system to serve EITC
claimants, who typically do not have complicated sources of income. 160 As a result, the
IRS should be capable of developing a program where low-income tax filers can update
their EITC applications each year by simply confirming the information that the
government has on their income, living, and family situations. This reform would reduce
the burden of self-certification, and, by lowering the EITC's error rate, reduce
administrative costs spent on audits. It would also help supplement the IRS's ongoing
efforts to promote free tax preparation assistance to low-income taxpayers through the
VITA volunteer program, as discussed in Part II.

155Williams, supra note
156See

41, at 1583.

Joseph Bankman, Simple Filingfor Average Citizens: the CaliforniaReady Return, 107
TAX NOTES 1431 (2005).
157Id.

58 See,

e.g., Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., Your California Tax Return May Be Ready And Waitingfor

You, CA.Gov, https://www.ftb.ca.gov/ReadyReturn/?WT.mc-id=IndividualsOnlineReadyReturn
visited July 12. 2011).
15 id.
160See

(last

General Explanation of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2005 Revenue Proposals,DEP'T OF

88 (Feb. 2004), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/bluebk04.pdf
(stating that most EITC claimants do not have income covered by the most complicated of the EITC' s three
income tests, which encompasses various kinds of investment income).
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D.

Reforming the Audit Process Used with Earned Income Tax Credit
Claimants
Restructuring the way that the IRS conducts audits of tax returns where the EITC
is claimed would help to make the EITC fairer.161 As previously discussed, after an
EITC claimant is targeted for an IRS audit, the audit is typically conducted on a
correspondence basis; moreover, EITC claimants are both more likely to be audited than
high-income taxpayers, and more likely to have difficulties with the auditing process.162
The IRS should thus enhance the audit process of EITC claims by lowering hurdles that
arise from communications issues, documentation requirements, and the audit process's
reliance on correspondence. 6 3
First, steps should be taken to improve the communication between the IRS and
the EITC claimant during the auditing process. An EITC correspondence audit typically
starts with a letter informing an EITC claimant that he or she is being audited. In 2007,
the National Taxpayer Advocate Service conducted a comprehensive survey of 754
different taxpayers who had been audited because of issues surrounding their 2004 tax
year EITC claims.164 In the survey, less than a third of the respondents felt that the initial
notification letter that they had received was easy to understand, and only half felt that,
after reviewing the letter, they knew what they were expected to do. 1 Given their
confusion, over ninety percent of the respondents contacted the IRS about their audits to
try to gain more information.166 This illustrates that most EITC claimants are left
overwhelmed and confused by the IRS's current communication process.
There are also several ways to clarify the means of correspondence. To make the
standard form letter easier to understand, National Taxpayer Service studies could help
determine what wording, structure, and information ought to be included in the letter.
The initial notification letter, and all subsequent communications, should also include the
name of a single case officer who can be contacted with any questions that audited parties
might have after receiving written communications that they find confusing. The case
officer should, whenever possible, also take the affirmative step of phoning the claimant
after a notification letter has been mailed. Finally, every notification letter and
communication ought to include information on the benefits of obtaining representation
during the auditing process.
Additionally, the current regulation forbidding the IRS from proactively referring
taxpayers to LITCsl68 should be abolished, and case officers should be empowered to
provide contact information for any nearby LITCs so that audited parties are aware of the

161See,

e.g.. Book. supra note 63; Nina E. Olson, Minding the Gap: A Ten-Step Programfor Better
Tax Compliance. 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 7 (2009).
162See

Holt, supranote 46, at 190-91 (defining "high-income" individuals as those earning
$100,000 and greater).
163 See Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 70, at 94 (noting that "barriers faced by taxpayers
during EIC audits may be divided into three primary categories: communication, documentation, and
process.").
164Id at 100.
165Id. at
95.
166id.
167See, e.g.. Taxpayer Advocacy Panel. 2005 ANN. REP. 4. 32 (2005): Nat'l
Taxpayer Advocate, A
Comprehensive Strategyfor Addressing the Cash Economy, 2 2007 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 27-30 (2007).
168See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying
text.
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assistance that is available.169 Similarly, once an audited claimant has retained the
services of an LITC, the LITC officials should not be barred from communicating with
the claimant about his or her current tax year issues, as is now the case. In addressing
past year controversies, LITC officers are frequently undoing errors committed by thirdparty tax preparers.170 Perversely, then, this rule encourages a situation where, after the
LITC solves the past year's problem, claimants often return to their familiar tax preparers
and undergo the same type of audit the following year.
In addition to improving communication during the auditing process, measures
should also be adopted to clarify the documentation required to resolve the audit. The
National Taxpayer Advocate's survey indicates that fifty-nine percent of the respondents
identified difficulty obtaining the necessary documentation, and only fifty-five percent of
respondents indicated that they even understood "how the documents would answer the
IRS's questions about the EITC claim."1 7 1 For example, EITC claimants are often asked
to provide documentation that their child was enrolled in a local school to prove that their
child meets the residency requirement for a qualifying child under EITC's guidelines.
Frequently, EITC respondents then submit documentation proving that their child was in
school for the previous school year, forgetting that to prove this fact for the previous tax
year, they need to provide documentation that their child was enrolled in both the spring
and fall semesters (spanning two school years).172 As a result, the initial notification
letter should be modified to provide a simple and explicit checklist of the documentation
that is required for the audit. The listed documentation should give specific, concrete
examples of all documentations required to complete the correspondence audit.
Even if the audited EITC claimants understand what is being requested, they
often have difficulty obtaining the proper documentation. In 2004, the IRS piloted the
use of affidavits from reliable third parties when an EITC claimant was unable to find
appropriate documentation for the child residency requirement. 173 Under this pilot
program, if an EITC claimant was audited and unable to find appropriate documentation
for that requirement, he or she could submit a form completed by a school administrator,
social worker from another agency, clergy member, or other reliable third party. The IRS
agent conducting the audit was then able to follow up with the third party and quickly
confirm information about the claimant's family status and living situation. Although
this system is certainly prone to error, and there is the possibility that the affidavit could
be fabricated, the National Taxpayer Advocate Service's 2009 Annual Report to
Congress indicated that "the affidavit is the most effective and accurate means of proving
eligibility and the taxpayers prefer the affidavit to providing documents, records, or
letters." 17 4 Given that the pilot program appears to have been a success, the IRS's 2004
It should be noted that the IRS is currently barred from referring taxpayers to LITCs by law.
The Taxpayer Assistance Act of 2010 is currently before the House Ways and Means Committee, and among
other changes, would allow the IRS to begin referring taxpayers to LITCs. See generally Congress
Introduces Bill to Help Taxpayers Cope with IRS, ACCOUNTING TODAY FOR THE WEB CPA (Apr. 13, 2010)
(discussing the Taxpayer Assistance Act of 2010, which will allow IRS employees to refer taxpayers to
LITCs), http://www.webcpa.com/news/Congress-Introduces-Bill-Help-Taxpayers-Cope-IRS-53885-1.html.
170Email from Tamara Borland, Dir., Iowa Legal Aid's Low Income Tax Clinic, to Joshua Boehm
(Aug. 8, 2011. 18:51 CST) (on file with authors).
171See Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate. supra note 70, at 106.
172Id. at 97.
169

173 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREAS., REP. ON FISCAL YEAR
2005 TESTS, at iii (2007).

174 Nat'1 Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 35, at 97-98.
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pilot program should be expanded and adopted as the norm during correspondence audits
of EITC claimants.
Third, the IRS should take steps to reform the audit process so that EITC
claimants are not under the impression that they are subject to the correspondence audit
process alone. In the National Taxpayer Advocate's 2007 survey, over seventy percent
of respondents would have preferred a system other than correspondence to resolve their
audit, 1 despite the fact that those audited have a right to request that they instead be
subject to a "face to face" audit instead of simply being subject to the correspondence
process.176 This right is difficult for those audited to assert, however, because they are
not typically notified of this right in initial communications and do not know how to
assert the right. As a result, the initial notification letter should also be modified so that it
informs audited tax filers about their right to a "face to face" audit, and includes a
checklist of the steps that must be taken to assert that right.' 77 This reform, along with
the others suggested, may increase the overall costs of the auditing process. But since a
decision has been made to use the tax system to administer one of the primary social
welfare programs for the working poor, these rights should not be denied simply because
individuals are unable to understand what is being asked of them in the process, what
documentation is required to resolve the audit, and what rights they have during the audit.
This is especially critical given the National Taxpayer Advocate's admission that a "lack
of representation during an audit puts EITC taxpayers at an inherent disadvantage over
those taxpayers who are represented." 7 8
E.
Moving Toward A Non-Adversarial Alternative To Tax Court
Given the above discussion of the difficulties low-income taxpayers encounter in
engaging the Tax Court's adversarial adjudicative processes, a system that would be both
more normatively fair and produce less incongruous results should be adopted.179 An
excellent model exists in another welfare context: Social Security Disability Insurance
("SSDI") adjudication.
SSDI proceedings, which are "inquisitorial" rather than
"adversarial" in nature, are distinct in a number of ways that may prove beneficial if
transposed to the EITC context. First, the SSDI adjudication is presided over by an
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ").180 The ALJ plays the roles of advocate for the
government, advocate for unrepresented defendants, and adjudicator who makes a
decision in the case. 181 Second, the cases are far less formal. They are typically
conducted in a small conference room with only the AU, the defendant, and
representatives or witnesses for the defendant present.182 As a result, the proceedings are
175Nat'1

176See

Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 70, at 95.
id. at 116.

177 Id.

178 Id. at 97.
179 See generally Jonathan P. Schneller, The Administration of Tax Expenditures: The Case of the

Earned Income Tax Credit, 90 N.C. L. REv. (forthcoming 2012) (arguing that the adversarial procedures of
the U.S. Tax Court are ill-suited to EITC controversies, due to claimants' resource constraints, and
advocating instead for a more inquisitorial, administrative model of adjudication).
"s0 RONALD A. CASS. COLIN S. DIVER & JACK M. BEERMANN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 598 (5th ed. 2006).

...
See Fred Davis & James Reynolds, Profile ofa Social Security DisabilityCase, 42 Mo. L. REV.
541, 549-50 (1977): see also Jon C. Dubin. Torquemada Meets Kafka: The Misapplication of the Issue
Exhaustion Doctrine to InquisitorialAdministrative Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1289, 1325 (1997).
182See CASS, DIVER & BEERMANN, supra note 180,
at 598.
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less intimidating to low-income workers who are fearful of the government and formal
-183
proceedings.
Moving to a model similar to the one used in SSDI adjudications for EITC
claimants who are deemed "delinquent" after IRS audits would have several distinct
advantages. First, it would help to alleviate the inequities that are suffered because EITC
claimants have limited access to counsel for the Tax Court proceedings. Moreover, it
would help to ensure that in at least one stage in the process, there is a government
advocate helping EITC claimants to present their side of the story. It would also create
potential efficiencies because the proceedings would require a single government
employee, instead of the judges, attorneys, and court staff who are currently used for "S"
cases in Tax Court. And finally, the SSDI approach would allow for a flexible
adjudicative inquiry in which ALJs could have follow-up meetings and take it upon
themselves to consult with social workers, school officials, or clergy members who
understand the circumstances of the EITC claimant. To be sure, ensuring the neutrality
of the ALJ proceedings will also depend greatly on how burdens of proof are allocated;
careful consideration must be given to what testimony and facts the ALJ must elicit
before denying benefits.184 Properly designed, the features of an ALJ system are far
better suited to the needs and capabilities of low-income litigants, and their application in
the EITC context should be considered accordingly.
IV.
THE NEED FOR INCREASED INVOLVEMENT FROM CONGRESS AND
THE LEGAL AID COMMUNITY
While the IRS-centered reforms proposed in the previous section have varying
levels of political feasibility, the legal aid community may be better placed to enact
timely and meaningful changes that benefit EITC claimants, given its core mission to
assist the poorest Americans. To that end, this part discusses discrete initiatives available
to the legal aid community that can address current pathologies in the EITC. As will be
discussed below, the legal aid community is already achieving substantial gains in
promoting awareness and developing easier methods for potential EITC claimants to file
federal tax returns. Yet it must still take additional steps to offer representation during
the auditing process and Tax Court proceedings, where, as noted above, there remains a
great unmet need for legal assistance.
To be sure, legal aid organizations are in the midst of an extraordinarily difficult
fiscal situation, and are already forced to turn away as many clients as they are able to
help.186 Congress has greatly erred in its decision to cut Legal Services Corporation
("LSC") funding from $420 million in 2010 to $348 million in 2012. As LSC President
James Sandman has pointed out, this sharp reduction in resources comes at "a time when
low-income families are increasingly seeking legal assistance" in matters implicating
fundamental needs, including "domestic violence, foreclosure, veterans' benefits, and

183See

Book, supra note 4, at 401-02.
correspondence with Tamara Borland, supra note 170.
1 See StaffReductions Hit Legal Aid Programs,LEGAL SERVS. CORP.
http://www.1sc.gov/media/press-releases/staff-reductions-hit-legal-aid-programs
attorneys will be cut from LSC-funded programs in 2012 and that Congressional
has decreased from $420 million in 2010 to $348 million in 2012).
186See Documenting the Justice Gap in America, LEGAL SERVS. CORP.
http://www.Isc.gov/justicegap.pdf.
184Authors'

(Jan. 2012), available at
(noting that 13.3% of
appropriations for the LSC
11 (Sept. 2009), available at
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other matters."1 While Congress surely faces tough budgetary choices of its own, we
question the wisdom, cost-effectiveness, and morality of weakening such a critical part of
the social safety net-precisely when the poorest Americans need it most-to garner
savings representing a tiny fraction of the federal budget.
Accordingly, we understand that the observations and recommendations we make
in this section may be difficult to effectuate at this particular time. But, even in a tight
budgetary context, the importance and scale of the EITC representation shortfall should
nonetheless command a greater amount of attention from Congress and the legal aid
community. In this section, we explore four steps that the legal aid community can take
to meet the needs of EITC claimants. First, we examine limited assistance programs that
are currently available to EITC claimants. In this discussion, we address the advances
that have been made in the last decade, as well as potential steps that can be taken to
improve self-help resources for EITC claimants. Second, we explore the failure of the
modern civil Gideon movement to include representation in tax proceedings. Third, we
analyze the need to increase the resources and enhance the services of LITCs. We
conclude by arguing that Congress should appropriate new budgetary funds to the LSC
for assisting in tax cases, notwithstanding austerity pressures, and that LSC grantees
should consider ways to reallocate existing resources to tax cases as soon as practicable.
The dual recognitions that (1) the EITC has largely displaced traditional welfare in
American anti-poverty policy; and (2) the EITC imposes legal burdens arguably more
daunting than those associated with traditional welfare, compel a renewed focus on the
program by Congress and the legal aid community.
A.
Limited Assistance Programs and the EITC
One innovative solution for meetin the needs of potential EITC tax filers is the
adoption of limited assistance programs.
Limited assistance programs are efforts to
provide self-represented litigants with the necessary information and resources to be able
to effective ly' resolve their legal disputes without an attorney or other trained
professional.
Examples of limited assistance programs include offering simplified
forms, providing pamphlets in a wide range of languages, establishing hotlines with legal
information, or even selling "unbundled" legal services. 190
These programs have been increasingly used to fill a wide range of needs across
the legal services landscape, and offer several potential benefits over more laborintensive options. First, limited assistance programs free up the time of legal aid lawyers
and pro-bono attorneys to work on cases that require high levels of professional
- - 191
training.
Second, limited assistance programs can have impressive returns to scale
18 See Staff Reductions Hit Legal Aid Programs,supra note 185. It should be noted that another
important form of funding for legal aid organizations, interest on lawyers' trust accounts, has also diminished
in recent years due to low interest rates. See Karen Sloan, Perfect Storm Hits Legal Aid (Jan. 3. 2011).
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jspid= 1202476843961&slreturn= 1.
1'8 Jeanne Charn, Legal Services for All: Is the Profession Ready?, 42 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1021,
1040 (2009) (using the Legal Aid Society of Orange Country I-Can! program as an example of "one of the
most innovative providers of legal services in the country.").
"9 See, e.g., John M. Greacen, Framing the Issue for the Summit on the Future of Self-Represented

Litigation,in SUMMIT ON THE FUTURE OF SELF-LITIGATION21 (2005) (discussing examples of the LSC moving

towards facilitating self-representation).
190Id.

19 See Charn, supra note 188, at 1058 ("Like the solo and small-firm bar, salaried legal aid lawyers
should focus on matters that require their extensive professional training and expertise, and leave to lay
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because the variable costs are low relative to the fixed costs of initially starting the
programs.192 Third, the programs may gain political support more easily due to their
emphasis on individualism. Fourth, commentators hypothesize that, by playing a larger
role in making their own case, clients learn lessons that they are able to use in the future
both to avoid conflicts and to help resolve them with less assistance. 193 As a result of
these benefits, LSC data currently suggest that three-fourths of all completed legal aid
matters involve "advice, referral, or limited assistance." 194 Although the EITC's
complexities often create a need for representation and assistance, limited assistance
programs can still play a pivotal role in ameliorating the EITC's administrative
shortcomings.
One of the most prominent examples of a limited assistance program designed to
help EITC claimants is the Legal Aid Society of Orange County's ("LASOC")
development of its "EIC Partner" website (www.eicpartner.com).1 95 The EIC Partner
website promotes the use of free internet filing software that helps potential claimants file
for the EITC. In the 2007 tax year, this service helped over 25,000 individual tax filers,
and resulted in nearly $12 million in EITC benefits being paid out.196 These usage rates
continue to improve, and as a result, the LSC recently reported that tax filers from 49
states used the I-CAN! software and were able to claim $110 million in total refunds. 197
This website and its associated organization serve three key functions.
First, the EIC Partner website provides information for potential EITC filers on
how to use I-CAN!. This software provides online forms and information that allow
users from anywhere in the country to file for the EITC while completing their federal tax
returns.198 Since the software is free and contains detailed information on common
problems confronting low-income taxpayers, it is, for many EITC claimants, a preferable
alternative to fee-based preparation software or professional help. Although the I-CAN!
software was once only available without charge to EITC-eligible individuals, it is now
available to any tax filer, unless the filer also owns a small business or is subject to a few
minor exceptions.1 99 The software is also able to e-file state tax returns for residents of

advocates, and self-help and limited-assistance centers all matters that these service resources can handle
appropriately.").
192See Richard Zorza. The Future ofSelf-Represented Litigation: Report
from the March 2005
Summit, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS 5 (2005), available at

http://lawworks1.com/publicfiles/PDFs/FutureOfProSe.pdf.
193 See Michael Milleman et al., Rethinking the Full Service
Legal Representation Mode: A
Maryland Experiment, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1178,1179 (1997) ("By playing a larger role in resolving the
problem, the client also may fully exercise her right to make basic case judgments and learn to avoid future
legal problems.").
194See Charn, supranote 188, at 1032.
195See id. at 1040. See also Legal Aid Society of Orange County. 1-CAN! E-File, 1-CAN! E-FILE,
http://www.icanefile.com (last visited July 12, 2011).
19 Legal Aid Society of Orange County, Quick Summary Jan. 14th, 2008 - April 15th 2008, 1CAN! E-FILE, available at http://www.eicpartner.com/UserFiles/I-CAN%/020EFile%20and%20800%20Number o20Summary.pdf.
197See 1-Can! E-File Hits New High in Tax Refunds to Low-Income Americans, LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION (March 1. 2011), available at http://www.1sc.gov/media/press-releases/i-can-e-file-hits-newhigh-tax-refunds-low-income-americans (last visited Jan. 9. 2012).
198See Charn, supranote 188, at 1040.
199Id.; see also Legal Aid Society of Orange County, I-CAN! E-File, I-CAN! E-FILE,
http://www.icanefi1e.org/index.asp?caller-- (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) ("You can generally use I-Can! E-File
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California, Montana, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and New York.200 In the 2007 and 2008
tax years, EIC Partner conducted an online survey that users were asked to complete after
using the program to complete their tax returns. In that survey, fifty-nine percent of
respondents indicated that the software was "very easy to use" and fifty-eight percent of
respondents indicated that they were "very satisfied" overall with the I-CAN Software. 20 1
The survey data did indicate one of the limitations of the service: seventy-two percent of
respondents indicated that they used the internet daily, and another fifteen percent of
respondents indicated that they used the internet weekly.202 As a result, although this
service is quite valuable to many low-income tax filers, its scalability is effectively
restricted to the subset of filers with computer proficiency, access, or both. Although this
does not undermine the potential benefits of the service, it does indicate a limitation in
meeting the needs of all EITC tax filers.
Second, in addition to the EIC Partner website, the LASOC runs a hotline that
potential EITC claimants can call for information. The hotline is a toll-free number that
greets callers with an automated message on the EITC, information explaining how to
apply, and information regarding access to the I-CAN! software.203 At the end of the
automated message, callers are prompted to enter their five-digit zip code. After doing
so, the callers are notified of free tax service centers in their area.204 As part of this
service, the LASOC actively encourages any organization that is able or willing to
provide advice on the EITC to register with the hotline so that its contact information is
listed after a caller enters a zip code in its area.205 In 2008, over 4,400 individuals took
advantage of the hotline. 206
Third, the EIC Partner website provides resources for partner organizations
seeking to assist EITC claimants. To this end, EIC Partner develops best practices that it
disseminates to organizations that wish to help potential EITC filers claim the benefit. 207
Additionally, partner organizations are given a unique URL to put on their webpage.
Any time the URL is used for a filer to access the I-CAN! filing software, the
organization that directed the tax filer there is given information for tracking its success
in helping individuals claim the EITC. 208 An excellent example of a partnering

unless you (or your spouse, if filing together) are in the military, are a church employee, are a non-resident
alien, sold real estate or you or your employer have a non-US address.").
200 See Legal Aid Society of Orange County, Frequently Asked
Questions, I-CAN! E-FILE,
http://www.icanefi1e.org/faq.asp?caller=#13 (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
201 Legal Aid Society of Orange County. User Survey Data 2007/2008 Tax
Year, 1-CAN! E-FILE,
available at http://www.icanefile.org/programs/Survey%/ 2OData%/o2OApril%/o2015.pdf (last visited Jan. 9.
2012).
202 id.
203 Legal Aid Society of Orange County, Nationwide 800 Number,
I-CAN! E-FILE, available at
http://www.eicpartner.com/UserFiles/File/i-can!%/ 20e-fi 1e%/20 8 00 %/o20number%/o20flyer(3).pdf(last visited
Jan. 9, 2012).
204 Id
205 id.
206 Legal Aid Society of Orange County. supra
note 196.
207 Legal Aid Society of Orange County. Becoming a PartnerSite, I-CAN!
E-FILE, availableat
http://www.eicpartner.com/UserFiles/File/i-can!%20e-file%20partner%20sites%20fler%282%29.pdf (last
visited July 11, 2011).
208 Id
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organization is the Montana Legal Services Association,209 which has created a website
based on the EIC Partner's information and software (www.montanafreefile.org). By the
2008 tax season, Montana Free File helped refund over $3.25 million to I-CAN! E-File
users in the state of Montana.210 Of that total, sixty-one percent was from the EITC. 2 11
This illustrates the success that legal services organizations can have in helping
individuals access social benefits that they are due through the tax system.
All three of these activities demonstrate how limited assistance programs can be
developed to help potential EITC claimants obtain the welfare benefits that they are
entitled to without resorting to expensive private tax preparers. The success of I-CAN!
shows that more resources and effort should be devoted to developing and spreading
awareness of the EITC assistance that the program makes available.
Although the LASOC's development of the EIC Partner program and I-CAN!
software is a laudable example of "a culture of bottom-up creativity and innovation" in
the development of legal services,212 there are still limits to the organization's ability to
provide legal services to EITC claimants. LASOC's technical assistance is restricted to
questions that users have on how to use the I-CAN! software, how to check their E-File
status, how to enter tax information into the software, and how to amend a rejected
return.213 All other inquiries about one's tax situation are directed to the IRS. 2 14
Accordingly, the organization's assistance operates exclusively at the filing stage of an
EITC claim, and does not extend to EITC claimants who are having their tax returns
audited.215 Since, as previously noted, EITC claimants are far more likely to be audited
than ordinary taxpayers and benefit dramatically from representation,216 this is a critical
gap in the information and services provided by the "EIC Partner" organization.
As a result, funds should be allocated to help develop information for those EITC
filers who are subjected to an audit. First, the EIC hotline should be expanded (or a new
hotline created) so that EITC claimants subject to an audit can gain access to information
on the audit process and the location of the nearest legal aid resource. Second, the
website should provide clear information on the audit and Tax Court process. For
example, the site could provide examples of the types of documents to submit during
correspondence audits to satisfy common IRS requests. Similarly, the EIC Partner
organization could begin development of audit best practices to complement the filing
best practices currently provided to partner organizations. Although not an exhaustive
list, all of these steps would be relatively straightforward mechanisms to improve the
coverage of taxpayer self-help and extend the limited assistance made possible by the
EIC Partner website into the domain of EITC audits and Tax Court adjudication.
As helpful as such programs can be, they are necessarily limited to individuals
with the literacy and initiative to attain self-help via navigation of such resources. As one
209 See

Montana Legal Services Association. 2007-2008 Montana Legal Services Association Guide
to Annual Implementationand Outreach: I-CA! E-File, I-CAN! E-FILE (Sept. 18, 2007), availableat
http://www.eicpartner.com/UserFiles/2007-2008%/0201-CAN%/o2OBinder(2).pdf.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 See Charn, supranote 188, at
1040-41.
213Legal Aid Society of Orange County. How We Can Help, I-CAN! E-FILE,
http://www.icanefile.org/help.asp?caller- (last visited Jan. 9, 2011).
214 Id.
215 See
id
216
Nat'I Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 65, at 119.
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commentator pointed out when discussing the limits of self-help in the tax system,
"[s]lightly more than 20% of the population lacks the skills necessary to read a food
label, fill out a form, or read a simple story to a child." 2 17 A single mother with full-time
work and child-rearing responsibilities but lacking Internet access may not be wellpositioned to avail herself of limited assistance resources such as the I-CAN! program.
The IRS's VITA program, as discussed earlier, is well-placed to remedy this gap.218
VITA's trained volunteers not only serve a critical role in areas where programs such as
EIC Partner and I-CAN! are not yet implemented, but can also assist where EITC
claimants have access to such technology but are unable or unwilling to use it. Many
legal services organizations recognize the importance of VITA in meeting this demand
and make concerted efforts to publicize VITA site locations to their clientele; it is critical
that they continue to do so.219
B.
Expanding and Improving Low Income Tax Clinics
Low Income Tax Clinics ("LITCs") can and must play a much greater role with
respect to representing EITC claimants who have been targeted for audits.220 Viewed in
light of the significant need for and dramatic impact of representation, the federal LITC
budget of $9.5 million per year is woefully inadequate,221 both when seen in light of need
for legal services and in light of the estimated $300 million a year that eligible EITC
claimants are denied due to the lack of representation.222 LITCs handled roughly 37,000
taxpayer controversies in 2008; assuming an LITC funding amount of $20 million (a
figure which assumes the full budget was disbursed along with matching spending by
educational institutions), the average cost per controversy can be estimated at $540.223
While it is unrealistic, at least in the immediate term, to expect Congress to expand the
LITC program budget in order to provide representation to every claimant, each
additional audit representation will, on average, diminish the amount of erroneous
deprivation ($623) by more than the cost of that representation ($540). Additional
expenditures on audit representation will not necessarily pay for themselves; in fact, if
such representation is effective, it will actually cost the government more because
claimants will be recouping a greater percentage of their EITC entitlements. Rather, this
comparison illustrates that dedicating more funding to EITC representation would be a
cost-effective use of administrative resources. Moreover, LITC funding might reduce the
cost of the IRS audit process, because represented and advised parties can be expected to
217 Bankman, supra note 156, at 1431.
218 For background information on the VITA program, see supra note 54 and accompanying
text.
219 Authors' correspondence with Tamara Borland, supra note
170.
220 The basic structure and function of LITCs are discussed in Part
II.C.3.
221Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 65, at
117.
222 In a 2007 study. the Taxpayer Advocate Service found that represented and unrepresented

taxpayers have nearly identical claim amounts before auditing-a difference of $36-but the average amount
disallowed after audit is $587 higher for non-represented taxpayers, yielding an overall disparity of $623
between taxpayers with representation and those without. Assuming that non-represented taxpayers would
have retained a similarly higher amount of EITC funding post-audit had they been represented, the aggregate
deprivation of benefits due to lack of representation can be estimated at over $300 million. Nat'1 Taxpayer
Advocate. supra note 70. at 97. 112. This figure is derived by multiplying the number of EIC audits
(517.617) by the overall disparity ($623).
223 This figure is derived by dividing the estimated total EITC budget ($20 million) by the number
of issues LITCs handle each year (37.000). It should be noted that of these issues, 10,142 cases were opened.
of which 1,804 were submitted to the U.S. Tax Court. It is likely that such cases required a greater
expenditure than the average cited here. Nat'1 Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 65, at 117.
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focus more on salient issues, provide necessary documentation in response to initial IRS
requests, and handle hearings in an efficient manner.224
Furthermore, the cost of representation must be viewed in the broader context of
the policy choices Congress made in enacting the EITC. By putting essentially no
resources into pre-certification, unlike other welfare programs such as TANF, Congress
effectively opted for low administrative costs at the expense of error rates, while shifting
the costs of compliance from the state to the low-income taxpayer.225 While Congress
has devoted significant resources to EITC compliance and enforcement (roughly $150
million annually), when viewed against a backdrop of $10 billion in EITC disbursals to
non-qualifying recipients for the 1999 tax year, it seems incongruous that only $10
million has been dedicated to help ensure that qualified audited recipients retain their full
benefits by providing representation.
Deepening Legal Aid Programs' Involvement with Tax Matters
C.
The LSC and its local grantees should consider recognizing the EITC's
pervasiveness and undertaking initiatives to assist EITC claimants. The LSC's latitude to
assist EITC claimants is somewhat restricted by its guidelines, which limit eligibility for
LSC assistance to individuals with incomes equivalent to 125% of the federal poverty
guidelines.227 However, a significant number of EITC recipients fall within the LSC's
eligibility threshold, as the EITC's eligibility criteria encompass individuals at well
below the guideline. 228
There are two paths for the LSC and grantee organizations to deepen their
support for EITC recipients. First, current LSC grantees could expand the range of
resources they devote to EITC assistance. To illustrate, recent data suggest that two of
the largest legal aid programs in the country, in New York and Los Angeles, dedicate
around one-fifth of their hours toward government benefits retention cases.229 These
include cases where individuals have been deprived of benefits under Social Security,
food stamps, TANF, Supplemental Security Income, and other federal and state-specific
welfare programs.230 These are undoubtedly important issues, and tax problems of EITC
claimants are just one of the many legal problems that low-income individuals face each
year. After all, there are an estimated "45 million to 75 million low- and moderateSee supra Part II.C.2 for a detailed discussion of the confusion that IRS audits typically present
to EITC claimants.
225 See Book, supra note 19, at 1106; David A. Super, Privatization,
Policy Paralysis, and the
Poor, 96 CAL. L. REv. 393, 434 (2008) (noting that in "cash assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid, the
government traditionally has borne the costs of helping claimants complete applications" but in the case of
the EITC, the government has left much of the "payment for administration to claimants .....
226 Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 70, at 98.
227 See 45 C.F.R. §1611.3(c)
(2005).
228 See I.R.C. § 32(b)(2)-(3) (West 2011) (setting forth EITC income eligibility
criteria); Income
Level for Individuals Eligible for Assistance, 74 Fed. Reg. 5620 (Jan. 30, 2009) (outlining LSC assistance
income thresholds).
224

229 See Funding Sources, LEGAL AID FOUNDATION OF Los ANGELES,

http://www.lafla.org/funding.php (last visited Dec. 24, 2011); Annual Report 2009- 10, LEGAL SERVS. N.Y.C.
53, availableat http://www.legalservicesnyc.org/storage/isny/PDFs/Is-nyc annrep_09-10-12-lo.pdf (last
visited Dec. 24, 2011) (note that the category "income maintenance" represents government benefits).
230 See, e.g., Government Benefits, LEGAL AID FOUNDATION OF Los ANGELES,

http://www.lafla.org/service.php?sect-govern&sub-main (last visited July 12, 2011): How We Help People.
LEGAL SERVICES NEW YORK CITY.

http://www.legalservicesnyc.org/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=23&Itemid=52#Help%20p
rotect%20and%20secure%20income (last visited July 12, 2011).
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income people who have legal problems for which interested and competent lawyers
might be a benefit." 2 31
Yet it remains critical to recognize the importance of the "hidden" welfare state
in contemporary anti-poverty policies. Consider, for instance, that the government
benefits litigation budget for New York City's Legal Services NYC ($8.9 million in
2009-10) is not significantly less than the entire federal outlay for EITC representation
($9 million as matching funds for LITCs).232 Given that LITCs can currently represent
so few audited EITC claimants-less than two percent, as noted above-legal aid groups
might consider allocating some portion of their government benefits litigation funding to
help close this yawning representation gap. While again acknowledging that the
feasibility and impact of any such shift would likely be modest at present, given stark
budget cutbacks at LSC grantees, it is nonetheless important to highlight the severe
underrepresentation of EITC claimants (even in relation to other underserved clients).
As we suggested earlier, lawmakers ought to recognize that even in times of
fiscal austerity, providing legal help to the poorest Americans facing EITC challengesinvolving benefits that finance basic needs-should remain a high budgetary priority. A
more promising path, accordingly, would be for Congress to allocate new funding to the
LSC and local legal aid societies for assistance of EITC claimants. While LSC grantees
choose their own priorities, the LSC could seek a special competitive grant to assist EITC
claimants with filing. Such funding could enable legal aid societies to serve as a
backstop to the automated and self-help measures that they are currently funding and
spearheading. There are clear opportunities for legal aid societies to expand and integrate
their self-help and limited-assistance tax initiatives, like I-CAN!, with their core
competencies in providing direct legal advice. Frequently, LSC grantees encounter
clients who are simultaneously trying to resolve prior year controversies while also
completing returns for the current year.233 At present, there is a strict division of funding
and responsibilities between legal aid organizations and VITA programs, which
complicates the resolution of such cases: legal aid attorneys must deal only with the past
year problems while referring the client to a VITA site to complete the current year's
taxes.234 To increase efficiency and reduce the risk of error and miscommunication, legal
aid attorneys should have the resources and mandate to deal with all of the client's tax
issues in such circumstances.
To be sure, any Congressional funding increase for pre-filing EITC assistance at
legal aid societies would likely engender political criticism because such reform imbues
the EITC with greater administrative costs, thus reducing its supposed advantage over
other welfare programs like TANF and food stamps. Ultimately, though, such funding
would likely generate sufficient benefits to outweigh those costs. Deeper legal aid
involvement with complicated pre-filing EITC cases could augment the salutary effect of
I-CAN!, VITA, and self-help by further cutting into the billions of dollars that EITC
claimants spend annually on private tax preparation assistance.235 If EITC claimants
231 James

L. Baillie, The Role of the Private Bar in a Model System for the Delivery of Legal
Services, 26 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & PO'Y 195, 198 (2005).
232 Annual Report 2009-10, supra note 229, at 53. Low Income Taxpayer Clinic GrantRecipients
Announced INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Feb. 17. 2012). available at

http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0.,id=254537.00.html.
233 Authors' correspondence with Tamara Borland, supra note 170.
234

Id.

235Cords,supra note 50, at 376-77.
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knew that government-funded advice were available, they would presumably be less
inclined to seek assistance from private preparers with high rates of non-compliance.
Thus, it could be expected that legal aid involvement in pre-tax filing would both ensure
that claimants retain a greater portion of the credit to which they are entitled, and reduce
erroneous filings encouraged by unscrupulous private preparers.
LSC competitive grants could also be targeted at representation in the audit and
Tax Court settings. As noted, some LITCs are already run by legal aid groups-as of
2011, roughly one in five were 236-such close coordination between general legal
services and low-income tax representation is laudable and should be encouraged. And
certain state legal aid groups, such as Legal Services of New Jersey, already provide
some tax services in-house.
However, the involvement of legal aid groups in povertylevel tax work is generally very low and must be expanded.238 One potential barrier may
be, as Book suggests, that "lawyers tend to view tax law as an isolated discipline,
requiring great specialization due to the area's complexity, both substantively and
procedurally."239 But as statistics show, the problems that most frequently trigger EITC
audits tend to fall within common niches-such as proof of a qualifying child under
EITC criteria-thus diminishing the breadth of material to learn.240 Moreover, a number
of LSC grantees have recently started or expanded foreclosure representation practices in
response to burgeoning demand for such services as a result of the recent housing crisis.
This illustrates the ability of legal aid groups to adapt quickly to meet client needs, and to
do so in a relatively complicated area of the law.
Even if the legal aid groups were to expand deeper into tax representation,
individual legal aid offices would be required to spend at least 12.5% of their basic field
grants to recruit and assist private attorneys to represent low income taxpayer clients,
usually on a pro bono basis.241 More than ten percent of the cases closed in 2007 were
assisted by pro bono attorneys.242 LSC grantees are under no obligation to allocate
private attorney-related funding toward any specific field, but if they targeted low-income
tax representations with some of those resources, it would help increase the visibility of
EITC representation in the professional tax community, and especially in the eyes of
private firms looking for pro bono opportunities. Firms can give special bonuses to
associate hires with tax clinic experience, allow associates to participate directly in
government-sponsored representation programs, or handle pro bono cases
independently. 243
D.
The Civil Gideon Movement and the EITC
Although the Supreme Court found a constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel
in criminal cases in the landmark 1963 decision Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court denied
236 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Low INCO1ME TAXPAYER CLINIC LiST (2011).
available at

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4134.pdf (last visited Feb. 19. 2012); see also Tax Legal Assistance Project.
LEGAL SERVICES NEW JERSEY LAW, available at http://www.1snjlaw.org/aboutlsnj.cfm#tax (last visited July
12, 2011) (example of one such coordination).
237 Id.
238 Book, supra note 4,
at 412.
239

id.

240

Id. at 395.

241 Budget Request Fiscal Year 2010.

LEGAL SERVS. CORP. 14. availableat
http://www.1sc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/br2OlO.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2011).
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a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases in the 1981 decision Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services.244 As a result, right to counsel in civil cases is a patchwork system
with access for the indigent dependent on the available legal services and statutes in
individual states.245 Currently, there are only three main categories of cases where most
state statutes or court rules provide a right to counsel in civil matters: family law matters,
involuntary commitment, and medical treatment.246 In fact, although individual states
provide a right to counsel in a number of other specific situations (guaranteed counsel for
military members, cases involving mental health records, and juvenile immigrant status
actions, for example), not a single state has a statute or judicial opinion that provides a
right to counsel in tax cases.247 This fact is not surprising in light of the "civil Gideon"
movement's core focus on courts.
Given this emphasis on non-tax matters, the EITC audit process and Tax Court
has not been an element of the current "civil Gideon" movement.248 The fact that
representation during tax cases is largely left out of the civil Gideon movement is
especially critical since many commentators have argued that the movement is better
positioned to make gains since the Lassiter decision in 1981.249 One major development
in the last decade is the American Bar Association's 2006 resolution that endorsed
providing "counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income persons
in . . . adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake, such as those
involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody ....250 As a result of this

development, groups representing the American Bar Association are now able to file
amicus briefs in cases that are seeking the right to counsel.251 Also, pilot legislation has
been passed in California252 and proposed in New York to expand the right to counsel. 253
In addition to these statutory and ABA initiatives, there is also progress in state
court systems toward a guaranteed right to counsel in certain situations. In 2007, an
Alaska trial court held that the state constitution created a right to counsel for a parent in
a custody action when the other parent has private counsel; in 2009, a Washington Court
of Appeals held that children have a due process right to counsel in truancy
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1065
(2009).
246 Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig. State Statutes Providingfor a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases. 40
244

CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 245 (2006).
247 Id. at 247.
248

See, e.g., NATIONAL COALITION FOR A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL,
http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/ (last visited April 7, 2012). The organization does not make reference to
providing tax cases and audits as one of the goals of the organization.
249 See Pastore,supra note 245, at 1066.
250 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION I12A (2006), availableat
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legalaid indigent defendants/is sclaid_06Al 1
2A.authcheckdam.pdf.
251See Pastore.supra note 245, at 1070.
252Kevin G. Baker & Julia R. Wilson, Stepping Across the Threshold: Assembly Bill
590 Boosts
Legislative Strategiesfor Expanding Access to Civil Counsel, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 551 (2010).
253See Pastore,supra note 245, at 1068.

2012]

THE EITC, LOW-INCOME WORKERS, & THE LEGAL AID COMMUNITY

213

proceedings.254 However, these court-driven gains in civil representation, like their
statutory and ABA analogues, wholly omit tax assistance from their ambit.
Addressing the need for civil Gideon in the context of the EITC is more
complicated than simply asserting that the right to representation during the IRS audit
process and U.S. Tax Court proceedings should be guaranteed and funded through
government revenue. As previously noted, the recent successes in expanding civil
Gideon have not been achieved by constitutional arguments or expansion of federal
programs.255 Instead, as one commentator has pointed out, the gains of the movement
have primarily occurred when state legislatures believe that the proposal will have a net
positive impact on the state's budget, or when arguments about fundamental fairness are
advanced by advocacy groups in a way that is persuasive to either the judiciary or
public.2 56
In the case of EITC claimants subject to audits, it may be possible to advance
both rationales for extension of civil Gideon rights. A fiscal case for free tax
representation could be made if it can be documented, and demonstrated to legislatures,
that providing counsel during the EITC auditing process and U.S. Tax Court proceedings
will help to keep potential claimants from resorting to state-provided social services. In
addition to reducing reliance on state services, EITC recipients would presumably spend
the bulk of their received funds on goods and services in their home state, boosting local
economies as well as state sales tax receipts. Although it has been extensively
documented that EITC claimants with representation are more likely to preserve the
benefit of the refund, whether those that are unsuccessful during the audit process are
more likely to need expansive state benefits has not been studied. 257
As to the fundamental fairness rationale for the EITC, it is critical to note that a
failed EITC audit can have drastic consequences for an EITC claimant. The Tax Court
case of Baker v. Commissioner illustrates the predicament of a taxpayer who has received
the credit and is later deemed ineligible. 258 Daniel Aaron Baker, whose income in the
year he claimed the credit was $15,349 and who bore significant childcare expenses for
his four-year-old daughter, was required to repay an assessment of $3,556 because he
failed to establish that his daughter resided with him over the course of the relevant tax
year.259 The entry of a $3,556 assessment against an individual with an annual income of
$15,349 (who also had significant child care expenses) presumably had a disastrous
financial impact. Such dire ramifications-which one cannot assume are atypical-go to
the heart of the ABA's statement that "counsel as a matter of right at public expense"
must be provided "to low income persons in . . . adversarial proceedings where basic
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In cases where legislatures have been persuaded by concerns of fundamental
fairness, it has often been with the assistance of advocacy groups.261 Although some of
these groups (such as parental advocacy organizations) have been distinct from the legal
aid movement, the most common group of advocates has been lawyers associated with
the legal aid movement.262 This includes "civil right to counsel advocates, civil legal aid
attorneys, and bar associations."263 For EITC claimants, this fact offers some hope.
Since there are over 500,000 audits of EITC claimants each year,264 there would be a
great deal to gain for attorneys if legislatures were convinced that EITC claimants should
have a government-funded right to counsel during auditing process and Tax Court
proceedings. As a result, the civil Gideon movement, and lawyers advocating for
increased representation, should take up the entirely reasonable argument that it is
normatively unjust to force low income individuals to self-certify that they are eligible to
America's largest welfare program through an exceedingly complex tax return, only to be
forced to defend themselves without assistance when they make a mistake, and often lose
the benefit for lack of representation.
V.
CONCLUSION
The EITC's administrative vacuum makes it more onerous for low-income
taxpayers to navigate than traditional welfare programs. In this article, we have
discussed and analyzed a number of reforms-both internal reforms to the IRS and
external initiatives for the legal aid community-that could help soften the program's
harsh edge. While some of these reforms may require increased Congressional funding at
a time when budgets are being slashed across the board, such funding generally pales in
comparison to the $10 billion in erroneous payments made under the EITC each year. If
the program's tax-based administration can justify the diversion of such significant
resources to non-compliant taxpayers, surely it is appropriate to devote far more modest
sums to assist qualifying taxpayers in claiming the benefit to which they are entitled.
The proposals in this article should be considered individually. Each stands to
provide unique benefits, and may well have unique costs as well. What is important is
not so much that any one of these proposals be adopted, but to recognize that the EITC's
tax-based administration raises a number of normative concerns in regard to the
program's treatment of low-income taxpayers, and to begin a discussion about how those
normative concerns might be addressed. Those concerned with providing legal aid to
low-income Americans must see the "hidden welfare state" for what it is-a prominent,
and often problematic reality for millions of low-income Americans-and take action
accordingly.
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